Mutual Tuning-In Relationships and Phenomenological Psychology

Abstract

Schutz worked on the foundation of social sciences throughout his lifetime. He depicts his philosophical enterprise in several ways, “the General Sociology,” (Schutz, A. 1962. Collected papers, vol. I. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, p. 137) “the universal cultural science,” (Schutz, A. 1962. Collected papers, vol. I. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, p. 132), “the Intentional Psychology,” (Schutz, A. 1962. Collected papers, vol. I. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, p. 137) and concerning phenomenology, “the constitutive phenomenology of natural attitude,” (Schutz, A. 1962. Collected papers, vol. I. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 132, 117) a discipline that is designated by Husserl also as “phenomenological psychology.” (Schutz, A. 1962. Collected papers, vol. I. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, p. 117; Schutz, A. 1966. Collected papers, vol. III. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (Abbr. CP III), p. 26) (Various designations have been given by different interpreters, such as “a philosophy of mundane reality,” (Natanson, M. 1962. Introduction to Collected Papers, vol. I. The Hague: Nijhoff, p. xxv) “social psychology of the life-world” (Wagner, H. 1984. The Limitation of phenomenology: Alfred schutz’s critical dialogue with Edmund Husserl. Husserl Studies I: 179–199, p. 190); “philosophy investigating the presuppositions of daily life,” “phenomenology of the social world” (Zaner, R. 1970. Introduction to relevance. In Reflections on the problem of relevance, ed. A. Schutz and R. Zaner, XI–XXIV. New Haven/London: Yale University Press, p. xi); “general theory of cultural sciences.” (Embree, L. 2008. The nature and role of phenomenological psychology in Alfred Schutz. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 39: 141–150, p. 145)) It deserves mention that from earlier writings through later manuscripts Schutz has frequently referred to phenomenological psychology that originates in Husserl. Schutz holds that through phenomenological psychology Husserl makes magnificent contributions to the foundation of social sciences. What does Schutz mean by that and why has he frequently referred to phenomenological psychology? In order to answer this question we need to know first what a doctrine of phenomenological psychology in Husserl is and then how Schutz inherits this doctrine for his use. In relation to that we would like to consider the question as regards what the specific character of phenomenological psychology in Schutz is. I hold that the notion of mutual tuning-in relationship that Schutz reveals in the article “Making Music Together,” (1951) in which Schutz works on the musical phenomenon and works out the precondition of all possible communications is mostly worthy of attention in connection to the question.