Abstract
In January 1878, Solov’ëv began a series of 12 well-attended public lectures in St. Petersburg billed as dealing with the philosophy of religion. In this chapter, we examine the background for the lectures and their originally conceived content. Rather than presenting a direct proof of God’s existence, Solov’ëv says God is given through faith, which yet does not prevent him from offering characterizations of God. Solov’ëv also presents in the lectures a vacillating attitude towards phenomenalism and with it how it can be said that we have knowledge of the external world. But is the external world itself to be taken merely on faith, or can it be philosophically proven? In addition to these and other “philosophical” issues, Solov’ëv also grappled in the lectures with whether we must ultimately trace the source of evil in all living things to God and with whether the West’s self-absorption is a historically necessary stage along the road to humanity’s complete union with God. But is such an account consistent and, above all, is it convincing? We will also look at a short incomplete essay which bears an unmistakable Kantian stamp and as such is unlike his other writings which display the influence of later German Idealism.
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Notes
- 1.
Unfortunately, there are apparently widespread inaccuracies circulating concerning the dating of these lectures. In his editor’s “Introduction” to the English translation of the Lectures, Boris Jakim writes: “The lectures continued until 1881 and were attended by many of the leading Russian intellectuals of the time, including Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy.” Solovyov 1995: vii. First of all, the lectures were not presented over a period of years, but over weeks. Additionally, whereas it is correct that Dostoyevsky, who was by this time a good friend of Solov’ëv’s, attended the talks, Tolstoy was present for only the eighth lecture accompanied by N. N. Strakhov, the literary critic and a colleague of Solov’ëv’s in the Ministry of National Education, who felt obligated to attend. Tolstoy, in short, was by no means impressed. In a letter to Strakhov from 16 March 1878, Tolstoy wrote: “However much Solov’ëv irritates me, I don’t wish you to write about him. It definitely isn’t worth it. Your opinion that he concludes a priori what he has found out a posteriori is absolutely right.” Tolstoy 1978: 318. Dostoyevsky’s wife Anna, who also attended the lectures with her husband, testified that the auditorium was full and that the audience included not just interested students, but also the cream of St. Petersburg high society. Dostoyevsky 1975: 290. This was the only time in the lives of the two great novelists, Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy, when they were in the same space at the same time. Yet they never met, Tolstoy purposely asking not to be introduced to anyone!
- 2.
Pis’ma, vol. 2: 95.
- 3.
Pis’ma, vol. 2: 242. This letter must have been composed sometime in late 1877, for Solov’ëv writes of starting the lecture series in the second half of January and therefore before final arrangements were made. Yet the letter could not have been written much earlier than late in the year, for he already quite confidently speaks of precisely 12 talks.
- 4.
Although nominally still a member of the Academic Committee, Solov’ëv demonstrated no greater concern for its work after his return from Bulgaria than before his departure. He did attend the meeting of 24 October but was absent again at the next five sessions. At the last one of the year on 12 December 1877, he was present but said nothing.
- 5.
[Anon.] 1878. The first lecture was presented in late January, and the announcement appeared not earlier than mid-February, thus only after the lecture series had already begun. However, a slightly different version had been distributed to the members of the Society already earlier.
- 6.
Additionally, since the length of the published first lecture is by no means extravagant compared to other published lectures, it is unlikely that Solov’ëv simply ran out of time in his presentation. For these reasons, we can conclude that the actual text of the first lecture at least was prepared after he composed his outline of the entire set of lectures.
- 7.
Solov’ëv’s actual lectures did receive critical press attention at the time. However, arguably the most telling is Kireev’s own assessments of them, coming as they did from what should have been a sympathetic audience member. He noted in his diary: “Solov’ëv’s first lecture took place and was unsuccessful. He came tired, relying on his memory and spoke poorly.” Concerning the second lecture, Kireev wrote: “Solov’ëv’s lecture was more successful than the first, but it was still far from meeting my expectations.” Cited in PSS, vol. 4: 541, 543.
- 8.
In official circles in Russia, be they governmental or clerical, philosophical intrusion was virtually synonymous with a critical attitude towards the establishment. For great detail on the Church censorship, see Kotovich 1909.
- 9.
Zernov, himself, was an interesting figure within the Russian church, both typical in rising from rural poverty, and atypical in being widely read with a degree of fluency in Latin and interested, as would be Solov’ëv too, in Christian reunification. His grandson, Nicholas, authored a book in England that concerned itself with Solov’ëv! Zernov 1944.
- 10.
Pis’ma, vol. 4: 233.
- 11.
See PSS, vol. 4: 562.
- 12.
As cited in PSS, vol. 4: 531. This note originally appeared in Pravoslavnoe obozrenie, October 1879: 223–224.
- 13.
Pis’ma, vol. 4: 233.
- 14.
A general consensus has emerged that there was no original text of these lectures. It often happened that Solov’ëv improvised in his various talks, and these occasions may be such instances. See Nosov 1992: 245–246.
- 15.
Cf. PSS, vol. 4: 240ff. We will discuss the material presented in the course in a later chapter.
- 16.
PSS, vol. 4: 9; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 1.
- 17.
Later in the same lecture, Solov’ëv significantly broadens his claim. Not merely does the unconditional principle determine everything that is essential in what we do and know, whatever that might mean, but it is also “all-embracing, excluding nothing.” PSS, vol. 4: 18; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 10. The burden, however, falls on Solov’ëv to explain how a “principle” that excludes nothing can yet determine only what is essential in human actions and knowledge, and not everything.
- 18.
Kulikova 2001: 115.
- 19.
PSS, vol. 4: 36; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 31. Poole explicitly recognizes that for Solov’ëv neither the existence of God nor of the external world can be rationally proved. However, if so, it is hard to see how Poole can claim that divine humanity can be the logical conclusion of sound philosophical method unless God’s existence has nothing to do with divine humanity! For God’s existence itself, in Solov’ëv’s eyes, is not a logical conclusion of sound philosophical method. In short, one would need to interpret Solov’ëv’s notion of divine humanity secularly. See Poole 2010: 134–136.
- 20.
At one point, Solov’ëv’s words suggest that our human will is in some manner involved in the conveyance of the sense of “objectivity” on judgments. He writes, “We demand that the object of our will have its own worth in order to be wanted, or, to use scholastic language, that it be objectively desirable, an objective good. Likewise, we demand that the object and the content of our thought be objectively true and the object of our feelings be objectively beautiful, i.e., not for us alone but for everyone unconditionally.” PSS, vol. 4: 34; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 29.
- 21.
Pronina recognizes that Solov’ëv’s view of objective cognition ultimately rests unabashedly on sheer faith. What she does not acknowledge is that such a position renders Solov’ëv’s already emaciated epistemology virtually impotent when confronted with any form of skepticism. See Pronina 2001: 78–79.
- 22.
PSS, vol. 4: 39; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 33. In these matters, it is interesting and insightful to compare Solov’ëv with Hegel, who wrote: “Thirdly and lastly, the immediate consciousness of God goes no further than to tell us that He is: to tell us what He is, would be an act of cognition, involving mediation.” Hegel 1904: 136.
- 23.
PSS, vol. 4: 39; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 33.
- 24.
PSS, vol. 4: 64; Cf. Solovyov: 1995: 60. Solov’ëv’s expression “true knowledge” is not to be understood as contrasted with, say, inaccurate knowledge, as if that were not an oxymoron, but with mere sense knowledge, i.e., knowledge of the purely contingent. “True knowledge” pertains to what is timeless and necessary.
- 25.
PSS, vol. 4: 94f; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 91f.
- 26.
PSS, vol. 4: 67; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 62.
- 27.
PSS, vol. 4: 81; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 78. Solov’ëv is certainly here borrowing Hegel’s chain of thought concerning “being.”
- 28.
Solov’ëv’s point here is essentially the same one made by the early Hegel, who famously wrote: “In my view, which can be justified only by the exposition of the system itself, everything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not only as Substance, but equally as Subject.” Hegel 1977: 9–10. Whether Solov’ëv had any direct familiarity with Hegel’s Phenomenology is unclear. In any case, Hegel’s essential point can also be found in the “Encyclopedia Logic,” though not with the same eloquence. See Hegel 1904, p. 353.
- 29.
PSS, vol. 4: 82; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 79.
- 30.
PSS, vol. 4: 71; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 66–67.
- 31.
PSS, vol. 4: 82; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 79.
- 32.
Although the “all” is merely in a state of latency, it, nonetheless, does “exist” in some manner that Solov’ëv fails to clarify. He writes, “God’s content exists here too, for without it, as we have seen, the existent Himself would be nothing.” PSS, vol. 4: 82; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 79. Furthermore, Solov’ëv refers to the latency and the actuality of the “all” as two modes of existence. PSS, vol. 4: 83; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 80. Here, he borrows freely from Aristotle without realizing the philosophical problems involved in doing so.
- 33.
PSS, vol. 4: 82; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 79.
- 34.
Solov’ëv does allude to this question further on in the sixth lecture, claiming that the question amounts to asking “Why does God need to be God?” PSS, vol. 4: 91; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 88. In this matter, he is simply wrong, for the two questions are not at all equivalent. In order for them to be so, Solov’ëv must demonstrate why God needs to posit anything at all, but that is precisely what Solov’ëv has not done nor even attempted.
- 35.
Writing in a highly metaphorical style, Solov’ëv, here in the sixth lecture, tells us that we can gain a certain knowledge of the deity by “abstracting from all of the manifested, determinate content of our external and internal life, abstracting not only from all of our impressions, but also from our feelings, thoughts and desires.” In this way, “we collect all of our powers in a single focus of our immediate spiritual being.” PSS, vol. 4: 84; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 81. Precisely how we are to understand this passage is unclear. Elsewhere in this lecture, however, he reaffirms his reliance on intellectual or ideal intuition, defining, or at least characterizing, it as “an actual relation to the world of ideal entities or an interaction with them.” PSS, vol. 4: 93–94f; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 91f. Thus, intellectual intuition is a relation between or interaction with ideal entities without the admixture of human emotions or thoughts. On the contrary, though, Solov’ëv also in this lecture tells us that “organic thinking, which seizes or grasps the integral idea of an object, amounts to that intellectual or ideal intuition that was spoken about in the previous lecture.” PSS, vol. 4: 92; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 90. In other words, intellectual intuition is both a direct relationship to ideal entities, bereft of thought, and, at the same time, a type or species of thought!
- 36.
Solov’ëv’s terminology is most curious, being largely derived from his understanding at this time of the dialectic in German Idealism. It is doubtful that Christian theologians, particularly Christian Orthodox ones, could accept referring to the universe, the “all,” as the opposite of the Deity, and in fact Solov’ëv’s own position does not allow for such an appellation for it.
- 37.
PSS, vol. 4: 80; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 77. Even at the time of the lectures, critics took exception to the perceived subtle pantheistic underpinnings of Solov’ëv’s doctrines and its use of elements from late German Idealism to explain fundamental Christian dogma.
- 38.
For an informed discussion of Böhme’s influence not just on Solov’ëv but in nineteenth century Russia, see David 1962.
- 39.
PSS, vol. 4: 51; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 46.
- 40.
PSS, vol. 4: 52; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 47.
- 41.
Solov’ëv writes, “This world, as the unconditional norm, is logically necessary for reason.” PSS, vol. 4: 113; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 112. Amplifying this position, he states, “Since it is indisputable that God, to exist actually and really, must manifest Himself, manifest His existence, i.e., must act in the other, the necessity of this other’s existence is thereby established.” PSS, vol. 4: 114; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 113.
- 42.
Kant 1997: A137–138/B176–177.
- 43.
PSS, vol. 4: 117–118; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 117.
- 44.
PSS, vol. 4: 88; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 85.
- 45.
PSS, vol. 4: 118–119; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 118.
- 46.
PSS, vol. 2: 236.
- 47.
PSS, vol. 4: 119–120; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 119. In a footnote on this page, Solov’ëv remarks that: “In considering the origin of the world, Christian theologians and philosophers always distinguished between the finite manifestation of the world in space and time and the eternal existence of the idea of the world in Divine thought, i.e., in the Logos. It must be remembered that in God, as the eternal reality, the idea of the world cannot be conceived as anything abstract, but must be conceived as eternally real.” PSS, vol. 4: 119f; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 119f. Indeed, as we have pointed out earlier, if we accept Solov’ëv’s general scheme in which God is real and eternal, so too must the world be real and eternal and not just its idea.
- 48.
PSS, vol. 4: 113; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 112.
- 49.
Kudrjashova writes that both Solov’ëv and Berkeley start from the same point, viz., that the existence of externality cannot be logically proven, although their paths then diverge. See Kudrjashova 2005: 103.
- 50.
Kant 1997: A373.
- 51.
PSS, vol. 4: 120; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 120.
- 52.
PSS, vol. 4: 124; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 124. Solov’ëv’s rather odd position has its basis in one of his favorite Biblical expressions: “The whole world lieth in wickedness.” 1 John 5:19. Some 15 years later, Solov’ëv would again use it in the sixth chapter of his major ethical treatise The Justification of the Good. SS, vol. 7: 131.
- 53.
PSS, vol. 4: 124; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 124.
- 54.
Whether such general statements can stand scrutiny is a matter we will leave aside for the purpose of elaborating Solov’ëv’s position. He may be arguing that were it not for the presence of evil, i.e., egoism, in all living things, life could not survive in the presence of hostile natural conditions. Such a stand, of course, could, in turn, be seen as supportive of a Darwinian struggle of the fittest. In any case, however, Solov’ëv’s statements could stand only on the basis of a number of presuppositions.
- 55.
For another fuller, though distinctively odd, treatment of the issue of free will see Nanashev 2002: 98–99.
- 56.
The practical danger of Solov’ëv’s position is that seeing evil in all living things, including the flower on my windowsill, can lead to a trivialization of evil. If evil is inherent in all life, what sense does it make to resist or obstruct its advance, or at least at what point do we forcibly resist it?
- 57.
PSS, vol. 4: 150; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 152.
- 58.
PSS, vol. 4: 18; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 11.
- 59.
Although strictly speaking not of philosophical interest, the assessment of medieval Christianity served as the topic of a major controversy involving Solov’ëv some years later.
- 60.
PSS, vol. 4: 40; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 34.
- 61.
This contrasts sharply with Solov’ëv’s later position in The Justification of the Good, where Solov’ëv will start from a naturalistic position.
- 62.
PSS, vol. 4: 70; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 66.
- 63.
Solov’ëv surely does not enhance the credulity of his position when he, almost laughably, ventures into the sort of speculative philosophy of nature historically associated with early nineteenth century romanticism. He goes so far as to project his idea of re-unification to the entire universe, finding three epochs: the first being the formation of celestial bodies under the influence of gravity; the second the development of complex forces, such as heat and light; and, finally, third the formation of organic life. See, for example, PSS, vol. 4: 138; Cf. Solovyov 1995: 139.
- 64.
One of the editors of the PSS holds another view. A. A. Nosov claims that what Solov’ëv has to say at one point in the unpublished manuscript with regard to hell conflicts with traditional Church teaching. Be that as it may, there is no reason to think Solov’ëv could not have simply removed the offending passage, if need be, without effecting the general train of thought in any way. See PSS, vol. 3: 516.
- 65.
PSS, vol. 3: 368.
- 66.
PSS, vol. 3: 370.
- 67.
Quoted in PSS, vol. 3: 515.
- 68.
PSS, vol. 3: 373.
- 69.
PSS, vol. 3: 374.
- 70.
Let us leave aside the separate but quite formidable question concerning the tenability of Solov’ëv’s identification of necessary laws for existence with necessary conditions for an object to appear to us. Despite being a corollary in Solov’ëv’s overall philosophical scheme, the identification can hardly stand up to critical scrutiny.
- 71.
This is not to say that Solov’ëv no longer held religion provided principles for action. Quite the contrary is the case. Further on in the manuscript portion, Solov’ëv, criticizing positivism for upholding empirical knowledge exclusively, writes: “However, if positive scientific or empirical cognition simply amounts to an assertion of facts, it obviously cannot give any principles for knowledge and for life, for fact and principle (fact et principe) are in a sense opposed concepts and cannot be identical.” PSS, vol. 3: 389.
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Nemeth, T. (2014). From Intuition to Faith. In: The Early Solov’ëv and His Quest for Metaphysics. International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d'histoire des idées, vol 212. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01348-0_4
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