Abstract
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, to extend the Euler equation (EE) approach, which was studied in Chaps. 2 and 3 for optimal control problems (OCPs), to find Nash equilibria in dynamic games. Second, to identify classes of dynamic potential games (DPGs), that is, games with Nash equilibria that can be found by solving a single OCP. In particular, the stochastic lake game (SLG) of Example 1.2 is included in one of these classes.
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References
Dechert, W.D. (1997) Noncooperative dynamic games: a control theoretic approach. University of Houston, URL: http://algol.ssc.wisc.edu/research/research/dgames.pdf
Slade, M. E. (1994) What does an oligopoly maximize?, J. Ind. Econ. 42, pp. 45–61.
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© 2013 David González-Sánchez and Onésimo Hernández-Lerma
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González-Sánchez, D., Hernández-Lerma, O. (2013). Dynamic Games. In: Discrete–Time Stochastic Control and Dynamic Potential Games. SpringerBriefs in Mathematics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01059-5_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01059-5_4
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