Abstract
Timothy Williamson holds that the knowledge rule of assertion, according to which one should assert only what one knows, is the single norm of assertion. I explain and defend Williamson’s thesis. I identify three key features associated with the thesis: the single norm of assertion should be constitutive, individuating and basic. Roughly, a constitutive rule of a speech act governs every possible performance of the act. A rule of assertion is individuating if it differentiates assertion from every other speech act. Finally, a rule of assertion is basic if it does not derive from other rules governing assertion, or other speech acts. I thus construe Williamson’s thesis as the claim that the knowledge rule is the only individuating, constitutive and basic rule of assertion. This thesis is compatible with the idea that assertion is governed by non-epistemic constitutive rules such as moral and prudential rules. Since these rules are not individuating, there is no need to understand Williamson’s thesis as bearing solely on the epistemic rule of assertion. I explain how the existing arguments in favor of the knowledge rule can serve to support the thesis that this rule is also the single norm of assertion. I also respond to some objections against the knowledge rule, and criticize alternative rules.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
All references will be to the slightly revised version of Williamson’s (1996) article “Knowing and asserting,” which appears as a book chapter in his (2000).
- 3.
Williamson also writes that “necessarily, assertion is a speech act A whose unique rule is ‘One must: perform A with the content p only if p has C’” (ibid., p. 241).
- 4.
We can imagine a community of speakers in which “aimless” conversations are encouraged, because, say, they are thought to foster creativity. But this does not obviously constitute a counterexample to the rule of relevance: a contribution that does not address what was just said could nevertheless be relevant to the broader purpose of the conversation, which is to foster creativity.
- 5.
As I pointed out in the previous section, this assumption is questionable. But if we did not make it, then assertion would have constitutive rules (e.g., moral, prudential, relevance rules) that are also constitutive of other speech acts. This would entail the falsehood of (1c). Making the assumption will allow me to identify an additional problem with (1c).
- 6.
Recall that I am assuming that moral rules, prudential rules, etc., are merely regulative rules of assertion. This allows me to stipulate that these rules are not in place in the imagined communities.
- 7.
Or perhaps I should say: if the rule ‘One must: perform speech act A with the content p only if p is true’ is constitutive of assertion, it is also constitutive of conjecture and swearing. However, as we will see in Sect. 5, there are good reasons to hold that conjecture is not governed by the truth rule.
- 8.
Or, more carefully: if these rules are constitutive of assertion, then they are constitutive of other speech acts as well.
- 9.
Williamson’s objection against TR still holds on this construal of the individuating condition. The proponent of TR cannot plausibly hold that the rule ‘One must: assert that p only if p’ is basic, while ‘One must: swear that p only if p’ is non-basic.
- 10.
See also Williamson (2000, p. 256).
- 11.
See DeRose (2009, Chap. 3). Hawthorne (2004) and Williamson (2000) also seem to support the sufficiency rule. Williamson writes that the knowledge account “can be roughly summarized in the slogan ‘Only knowledge warrants assertion.’ ‘Warrant’ is used here as a term of art, for that evidential property (if any) which plays the role of the property C in the correct simple account of assertion” (2000, p. 243).
- 12.
I should note, however, that Brown does not endorse the sufficiency rule.
- 13.
See Williamson (2005) for a defense of the sufficiency rule that maintains a classical invariantist position. For those who endorse contextualism, a relativized version of the knowledge norm is required: “A speaker, S, is well-enough positioned with respect to p to be able to properly assert that p if and only if S knows that p according to the standards for knowledge that are in place as S makes her assertion” (DeRose 2009, p. 99).
- 14.
KR should be slightly amended: there should be an appropriate causal connection between the asserting and the knowing. As Williamson points out, “if I know p and assert p, but the asserting is causally independent of the knowing, then something is wrong with the asserting” (2000, p. 268, n. 16). See Turri (2011). In what follows, I will construe KR as requiring an appropriate causal connection between assertion and knowledge.
- 15.
See, for instance, Weiner (2005) for an account based on the truth rule, and Douven (2006), Kvanvig (2011) and Lackey (2007) for accounts based on variants of the warrant rule, according to which, roughly, one should assert that p only if one’s belief that p is justified (or reasonable). In my view, many of the objections Williamson (2000) raises against these kinds of account still hold. See DeRose (2009, Chap. 3) for additional criticisms.
- 16.
MBP can also be derived from the weaker norm:
(RBKB) One must: believe that p only if one rationally believes that one knows that p.
But substituting RBKB for KNB avoids none of the problems I am about to signal.
- 17.
RBKB does better here, for Sally rationally believes that she knows that it is 3 PM. Hence, according to this norm, her belief, just like her assertion, is proper. But this should not lead us to prefer RBKB over KNB. Consider the slightly different case in which Sally rationally believes that she knows that it is 3 PM, while it is in fact 2 PM. According to RBKB, Sally’s belief that it is 2 PM is proper; however, TR entails that her assertion that it is 2 PM is improper. This is odd.
- 18.
Note, though, that for DeRose (2009, p. 186–187), personal certainty (or high confidence) rather than belief is the attitude required for knowledge.
- 19.
Brown (forthcoming) imagines a subject in a low-standards context who properly believes that p. Sally is at the train station and, after consulting the timetable, forms the true belief that the next train is an express. She is then approached by a stranger who tells her that it is extremely important to him whether the next train is an express or not. It seems that she is not in a position to properly assert that the next train is an express, even though she can still properly believe that.
- 20.
Like contextualism, relativism holds that knowledge claims have context-sensitive truth values; however, unlike contextualism, it denies that the content of a knowledge claim is context sensitive. According to relativism, the epistemic standards that are relevant to evaluating a knowledge claim are those in place in the context of assessment. Hence, the same knowledge claim may be assigned different truth-values in different contexts of assessment.
- 21.
- 22.
Williamson writes: “It is plausible […] that occurrently believing p stands to asserting p as the inner stands to the outer. If so, the knowledge rule for assertion corresponds to the norm that one should believe p only if one knows p” (2000, pp. 255–256). See also Adler’s (2002) assertion/belief parallel.
- 23.
Alternatively, one could hold that because of the speaker’s lack of knowledge, the assertion really is improper simpliciter; however, given the circumstances of the assertion, the speaker can be excused from this impropriety.
- 24.
- 25.
Note that the problem concerns not the teacher’s epistemic position (she is assumed to know both what evolutionary theory states and that this theory is well supported by evidence), but her disbelief.
- 26.
Weiner’s case is under-described. Perhaps Holmes has cleverly detected a clue that clearly incriminates Moriarty, in which case he would be entitled to assert the content of (4). But if we rule out scenarios such as this one, the claim that Holmes properly asserts (4) strikes me as implausible.
- 27.
See Bach and Harnish (1979, Chap. 3).
- 28.
This is, of course, just a partial account of assertion: presumably, assertion is associated with communicative intentions as well. See, for instance, Bach and Harnish (1979). Note that they construe ‘express’ slightly differently than I do. On their account, in asserting that p one (among other things) expresses the belief that p, where to express a belief is (roughly) to communicatively intend the hearer to take one’s utterance as reason to think one has that belief. This difference does not affect the present point, since they agree that an insincere assertion is improper.
- 29.
- 30.
In my (2013), I show that KR derives from KPR and what I call the manifestation rule, that is, ‘One must: assert that p only if that assertion manifests the belief that p.’ I also explain how this derivation avoids the objections Brown (forthcoming) raises against other explanations of commonality.
- 31.
I am grateful to Sherri Irvin for her useful comments on an earlier draft.
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Montminy, M. (2013). The Single Norm of Assertion. In: Capone, A., Lo Piparo, F., Carapezza, M. (eds) Perspectives on Pragmatics and Philosophy. Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01011-3_2
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