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Attachment and Forgiveness in a Behavioural, Non-Cooperative Dynamic Game

  • Fouad El Ouardighi
Chapter
Part of the International Series in Operations Research & Management Science book series (ISOR, volume 198)

Abstract

Despite an extensive body of economic literature discussing partner selection based on rational anticipation of the other people’s behaviour, the influence of players’ behavioural patterns on the path of their collaborative decisions has as yet rarely been evaluated in the context of a dynamic game. This chapter seeks to fill that gap by proposing to evaluate how certain specific behavioural patterns, namely propensity to forgiveness and propensity to attachment, can give rise to different collaborative archetypes. These two behavioural patterns are important as both are prominent in the most influential game theory and managerial approaches to cooperation. They are therefore used to derive a typology of behavioural profiles. Computation of each profile’s equilibrium effort leads to a ranking of the possible player profiles. The results suggest that the proposed behavioural profiles could be used for selection of potential partners.

Keywords

Cooperation Familiarity Trust Behavioural profile Dynamic games 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.ESSEC Business SchoolCergy PontoiseFrance

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