Abstract
Hypotheses are tentative solutions to problems. They are guesses, or conjectures, but they are not wild guesses; they are guesses made by informed and creative minds. Even after such rigorous testing any scientific theory or hypothesis may be ultimately replaced one that is superior. In this sense all scientific knowledge is regarded as being provisional.
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Other Useful Reading
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Truran, P. (2013). The Solutions to Problems. In: Practical Applications of the Philosophy of Science. SpringerBriefs in Philosophy. Springer, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-00452-5_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-00452-5_5
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