Abstract
Although it is clear that philosophers are unable to identify unique methodological elements that characterize scientific research, it appears that we can identify certain features from which it derives its explanatory power. An awareness of the philosophical and historical underpinnings of science provides the researcher with the conceptual and analytical tools to examine and evaluate his practice. These tools will also help in the assessment of the work done in his own field, and in other disciplines.
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Truran, P. (2013). It’s About Attitude and Experiments. In: Practical Applications of the Philosophy of Science. SpringerBriefs in Philosophy. Springer, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-00452-5_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-00452-5_2
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