Abstract
The book proceeds on the basis of admittedly contentious theoretical assumptions. Some of these assumptions pertain to the positivist outlook that shapes the book’s understanding of the concept of a source of law. Other assumptions have to do with the functionalist method with which the book approaches a comparative analysis of the judicial use of legal scholarship. The main purpose of this introduction is to reveal and explain these different substantive and methodological assumptions. The assumptions will never be explicitly defended, although the whole book might be regarded as providing an “indirect” defense of them. The introduction also provides an overview of the content of the book’s chapters. The general structure of the book is as follows. The initial chapters are meant to clarify the general notion of a source of law. Once that notion is clarified, legal scholarship will become the main focus of attention. The largest part of the book is concerned with conceptual and empirical issues pertaining to the use of legal scholarship by judges. Chapter 6 will touch on some normative questions pertaining to how scholarship ought to be used by judges.
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Notes
- 1.
In 2011 I had the invaluable opportunity to spend a semester at Harvard Law School as a visiting researcher among academic lawyers with the most diverse backgrounds. The elusiveness mentioned in the text, something in which I have believed for quite some time, was corroborated at Harvard. Everyone willing to discuss the issue seemed to have an opinion about the role that legal scholarship plays in judicial decision-making. But the opinions varied widely from the enthusiastic—“scholarship is extremely important for judges”—to the thoughtful—“scholarship is influential, but its influence is exerted indirectly through concepts and doctrines that are picked up by judges during their training”—to the cynical—“it is said that scholarship is a source of law—but, of course, this is said by scholars”.
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Shecaira, F. (2013). Introduction. In: Legal Scholarship as a Source of Law. SpringerBriefs in Law. Springer, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-00428-0_1
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