Abstract
Titchener, it has been observed, “always disliked labels as pinning one down” (Boring 1927, p. 497). He did not recognize himself as an “introspectionist.” Indeed, so extreme was his dislike of labels that he, characteristically, did not refer to “his [own] school by any other words than ‘we’” (Boring 1927, p. 497). Titchener did find the term “structuralism” for his own system somewhat useful, because it stressed the contrast between his own approach and that of functional psychology, but he was never happy with this nomenclature (Evans 1984, pp. 120–122).
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- 1.
We will here be very critical of Titchener’s psychology and experimental methodology. This is not to suggest, however, that his many experimental findings are all devoid of merit; the individual strength of each purported experimental finding will have to be assessed appropriately. See Schwitzgebel for a sympathetic discussion of selected laboratory training exercises (e.g. Schwitzgebel 2011, Chap. 5). Our criticism will be targeted at the core assumptions and core methodology of Titchenerian psychology.
- 2.
- 3.
Indeed, “[t]he psychologist arranges the mental elements precisely as the chemist classifies his elementary substances” (Titchener 1926, p. 49).
- 4.
New elements are still being discovered with some regularity. Only a few years ago, for example, the discovery of the predicted “superheavy” element 117 was announced.
- 5.
For the purposes of the present argument, no position is taken on whether this is in fact a correct view of modern scientific chemistry.
- 6.
We are setting aside, here, the relatively late development in Titchener’s thought regarding the nature of sensation. Briefly put, Titchener felt impelled by Külpe’s definition of a sensation as the sum of its attributes, to accept sensation attributes as more elemental that the sensation itself (Boring 1937, p. 476). At an even later point (in fact, starting in 1922 with personal correspondence to Boring) he suggested—as the psychological analogue to his conviction that all of physics was expressible in terms of the three dimensions of space, mass and time—that all sensory attributes were expressible as the dimensions of quality, intensity, extensity, protensity (duration), and attensity (clearness, vividness) (Boring 1937, pp. 472–4). We are setting this very late view aside in our discussion of Titchener.
- 7.
As he put it, “experiments already made furnish additional proof that the old ‘laws’ of association are psychologically valueless” (Titchener 1920, p. 168).
- 8.
The quotes are from the Student’s Manual, Volume I Qualitative Experiments: Part I.
- 9.
The idea, here, seems to be that of psycho-physical parallelism.
- 10.
Setting aside deliberate human action, environmental force majeure, and so on.
- 11.
For Titchener the “elements are posited by theory” (Hatfield 2005, p. 267).
- 12.
- 13.
We will discuss affections late. Here, we simply note that Titchener favors the classification of them as a separate conscious element “ranged alongside of sensation in the composition of consciousness” (Titchener 1901–1905, p. 91).
- 14.
Titchener offered some finer distinctions with respect to sensations and images in a note (Titchener 1904) published a few years later.
- 15.
Remembering that perception, in turn, is “primarily a group of sensations” (Titchener 1901–1905, p. 127).
- 16.
As an illustration of this approach, consider Titchener’s analysis of the abstract idea of “hour.” Examining his own idea of “hour,” he explains that this mental item simply “consists of the picture of a small outline square drawn on a white background; and this square is one of the squares of the daily report-cards upon which the marks for every hour’s work were entered at the first school that he attended” (Titchener 1914, p. 221, italics added).
- 17.
In 1921 Titchener published a biographical essay about Wundt (who had died the previous year). Here, he attempts to answer the question: whence “did Wundt derive his idea of an experimental psychology?” (Titchener 1921, p. 164). His answer is that the “proximate source of Wundt’s idea is patent”—it is, namely, the sixth book of John Stuart Mill’s Logic, in which the associationist doctrine of mental chemistry is expounded. The cardinal difference between Mill and Wundt is that “Mill talked about experiments and Wundt carried them out” (Titchener 1921, p. 165).
- 18.
Leahey similarly argues for a deliberate filtration of Wundt on the part of Titchener, though he emphasizes Titchener’s positivist philosophy of science more than his associationist psychology (Leahey 1981).
- 19.
Danziger, it should be noted, called attention to this biographical fact some thirty years ago (Danziger 1980, p. 246).
- 20.
Titchener was, at Brasenose College, a Senior Scholar in Philosophy, as well as the Classics and Senior Hulmian Exhibitioner (Pillsbury 1928, p. 95).
- 21.
Pillsbury notes that Titchener finally seems to have abandoned his allegiance to mental chemistry very late in life (Pillsbury 1928, p. 97). As far as Titchener’s very late views are concerned, we take no position on this issue.
- 22.
Titchener came, as a student at Oxford, “under the influence of the English psychology, apparently not so very much modified from the time of the Mills” (Pillsbury 1928, p. 96).
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Beenfeldt, C. (2013). Titchener’s System of Psychology. In: The Philosophical Background and Scientific Legacy of E. B. Titchener's Psychology. SpringerBriefs in Philosophy. Springer, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-00242-2_4
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