Early British Associationism

  • Christian BeenfeldtEmail author
Part of the SpringerBriefs in Philosophy book series (BRIEFSPHILOSOPH)


We begin our analysis by considering the philosophical school of empiricism in early modern thought. In a sentence, a central feature of this philosophical approach was the epistemological contention that all knowledge has its origin in simple sensory experience. This claim raises the following psychological question: given that complex mental phenomena (such as an abstract train of thought) obviously are not direct and simple deliverances of sense, what is their nature and where do they come from? Associationism was the name given to the increasingly elaborate account developed to answer this query.


Simple Complex Complex Idea Mental Content Just Noticeable Difference Stimulus Magnitude 
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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Media, Cognition and CommunicationUniversity of CopenhagenCopenhagenDenmark

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