Abstract
In their meta-scientific studies of psychology, psychologists often use what they take to be the views of the historian of science, Thomas Kuhn. Although a critical examination of psychology or aspects of psychology is laudatory, psychologists also need to accurately understand and to assume a critical stance toward the meta-scientific views that they employ. In this chapter, the views of the historian of science, Thomas Kuhn, are described and examined. The following major questions are addressed: What were Kuhn’s investigative methods? What are his views of science? What exactly do Kuhn’s conclusions about science mean? How does Kuhn rely on psychology? and, What does Kuhn have to say about psychology.
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O’Donohue, W. (2013). The Spell of Kuhn on Psychology. In: Clinical Psychology and the Philosophy of Science. Springer, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-00185-2_5
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