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Epistemology and Logical Positivism

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Clinical Psychology and the Philosophy of Science

Abstract

I start this chapter with a brief introduction to contemporary epistemology. Epistemology is the philosophical study of knowledge—more specifically, the questions of “What is knowledge?”; “Is knowledge even possible?”; (also known as the skeptical question)—and “How does knowledge grow?” being some of the central problems of epistemology. In most contemporary views, epistemology and the philosophy of science are highly interrelated because science attempts to produce knowledge—and for many, it has been a unique ability to produce knowledge.

Logic positivism is dead, or as dead as a philosophical movement ever becomes—John Passamore (1967).

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Correspondence to William O’Donohue .

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O’Donohue, W. (2013). Epistemology and Logical Positivism. In: Clinical Psychology and the Philosophy of Science. Springer, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-00185-2_3

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