Abstract
At this point of my discussion I can leave the stage, of previewing and explication of theoretical, premises and turn to the subject matter proper, the comparative examination of the Franco-German post-war periods as of 1945. What immediately strikes us is the similarity of the French position after 1945 with the Italian position of 1918. Just as the Allies erected a last front for the Italians as of November 1917 who were then able to stay the course until the German surrender, so did the Allies bear the brunt of the war for the French until the unforgettable day of libération in August 1944 on which de Gaulle, at the head of his own improvised forces, returned to Paris. The decisive difference lies in the fact that the defeat of the French in 1940 turned out to be much more unequivocal than that of Italy in 1917 in that the French ranks (who were absent only in Yalta) were much more conspicuous under the allied powers than the Italians at the end of the 1st World War. It is well known that the latter were only conceded a subordinate role in the peace treaties of 1919. Above all one is astonished at the analogy between the Italian and the French dilemmas as soon as they find their basis in the above-mentioned model of post-stress self-evaluation.
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References
Cf. Tony Judt: Past Imperfect. French Intellectuals 1944–1956, Berkeley Los Angeles Oxford 1992
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(2009). France 1945: The double falsification. In: Theory of the Post-War Periods. TRACE Transmission in Rhetorics, Arts and Cultural Evolution. Springer, Vienna. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-211-79914-7_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-211-79914-7_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Vienna
Print ISBN: 978-3-211-79913-0
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