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Economic Loss Caused by GMOs in the United Kingdom: England & Wales

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Economic Loss Caused by Genetically Modified Organisms

Part of the book series: Tort and Insurance Law ((TIL,volume 24))

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Abstract

There is currently no civil liability or other compensation regime applying specifically to liability for GMOs (cf. the administrative liability scheme described below), but at the time of writing the Government was engaged in a public consultation about proposals for introducing a statutory redress scheme in respect of economic damage resulting from GMO presence in non-GM crops. There are no plans to introduce new statutory liability or compensation provisions for other damage caused by GMOs, though liability may arise in some cases under existing legal principles. The proposed scheme relates to England only; it is for the devolved authorities in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland to develop their own policy in the area.

The following report focuses on the law of England and Wales only. References to Scots law are only included where appropriate. On the state of Scots law, see e.g. M. Ruskell, GM Liability — Who Should Carry the Can? (2003, available at http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/ bills/pdfs/mb-consultations/gm-consultation.pdf) 10–11.

I am very grateful to Elen Stokes for research assistance in connection with this report.

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References

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Authors
  1. Ken Oliphant
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Bernhard A. Koch

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Oliphant, K. (2008). Economic Loss Caused by GMOs in the United Kingdom: England & Wales. In: Koch, B.A. (eds) Economic Loss Caused by Genetically Modified Organisms. Tort and Insurance Law, vol 24. Springer, Vienna. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-211-77988-0_32

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-211-77988-0_32

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Vienna

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-211-77987-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-211-77988-0

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