Abstract
The purpose of the “shifts in governance” project is to examine, from a comparative perspective, the changing relationships between private law and public law systems of compensation, concentrating on some key areas where accidents have been prevalent and compensation systems have been most developed. The task I have set myself in this paper is not to examine trends as they have occurred in different jurisdictions, but rather to attempt to provide a theoretical framework for analysing and understanding such trends.
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Notes
For a different approach, see D. Dewees/D. Duff/M. Trebilcock, Exploring the Domain of Accident Law: Taking the Facts Seriously (1996) 5–12.
See particularly, E.J. Weinrib (ed.), Tort Law (1991) and E.J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (1995).
P. Cane, Atiyah’s Accidents Compensation and the Law (6th ed. 1999) 356–357.
For an influential exposition of the argument, see W. Friedmann, Law in a Changing Society (2nd ed.1972), chap. 5.
G. Zarb, ‘Social Security and Mental Health: Defining the Issues’ in G. Zarb (ed.), Social Security and Mental Health (1996) 3–10.
For (dated) information on the incidence of first-party insurance for accident compensation see P. Corfield, Private Insurance, in D. Harris et al, Compensation and Support for Illness and Injury (Oxford University Press, 1984), chap.8.
M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (1962), 190–191.
A. Ogus, Regulatory Paternalism: When Is It Justified?, in K. Hopt/E. Wymeersch/H. Kanda/H. Baum (eds.), Corporate Governance in Context: Corporations, States and Markets in Europe, Japan and the U.S (2006), chap. 16.
Cf A. Ogus, Do We Have a General Theory of Compensation?, (1984) 37 Current Legal Problems 29.
Cane (fn. 3), chap. 19.
Dewees et al (fn. 1) 56, 142–143, 389–390.
Cane (fn. 3) 359–360.
A. Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (2004) 46–51.
Epitomised by the influential G. Viney, Le Declin de la Responsabilité Civile (1964).
A. Ogus, Costs and Cautionary Tales: Economic Insights for the Law (2006) 147–151.
S. Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law (1987).
R. Cooter/T. Ulen, Law and Economics (4th ed. 2004) 328–331.
See above Cane fn.10.
Cane (fn. 3) 246.
Analysis in the 1970s assessed the administrative cost of tort cases to be 85% of that paid out by way of compensation and today that figure may be even higher: Cane (fn. 3) 337–342.
Thus estimates tend to be between 5% (of the amount paid out by way of compensation) for simple schemes and 20% for more complex schemes: Cane (fn. 3) 342–346.
Ogus (fn. 13), chap. 4.
M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (1971).
A. Ogus, Legislation, the Courts and the Demand for Compensation, in R.C.O. Matthews (ed.), Economics and Democracy (1985) 151–167.
G. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System, (2000) 98 Michigan Law Review 953.
M.J. White, Legal Complexity and Lawyers’ Benefit from Litigation, (1992) 12 International Review of Law and Economics 381.
See New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Expert Witnesses (Report No 109, 2005).
See especially, A. Breton/R. Wintrobe, The Logic of Bureaucratic Conduct (1982); W. Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Public Economics (2004).
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Ogus, A. (2007). Shifts in Governance for Compensation to Damage: A Framework for Analysis. In: van Boom, W.H., Faure, M. (eds) Shifts in Compensation Between Private and Public Systems. Tort and Insurance Law, vol 22. Springer, Vienna. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-211-71554-3_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-211-71554-3_2
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