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Damage Caused by Omission

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Essential Cases on Natural Causation

Part of the book series: Digest of European Tort Law ((DIGEURO,volume 1))

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Abstract

One of two slaves of a tenant farmer had lit a furnace, and the other later fell asleep 1 when guarding the fire. The owner of the farm sued the slaves’ owner, because the fire burned the farm down.

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References

  1. Cf. F. Wieacker, Textstufen klassischer Juristen (1960) 239 ff., comparing the text with Ulpian, Collatio 12,7,7. Although the Digest report an actio utilis, it is more probable that the lawyers granted an actio in factum, modelled on the facts of the individual case.

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  2. Likewise, causing someone to starve could be regarded as occidere; see Ulpian/ Nertius, D. 9,2,9,2.

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  3. R. Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations (paperback ed. 1996) 979 f., 983, 1043 f.

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  4. T. Honoré, Are Omissions Less Culpable? in: P. Cane/ J. Stapleton (eds.), Essays for Patrick Atiyah (1991) 31 ff., 36 ff.; E. Deutsch, Allgemeines Haftungsrecht (2nd ed. 1995) no. 98 ff., further references within. For the ius commune see N. Jansen, Die Struktur des Haftungsrechts (2003) 307 f.: Here, culpa levissima was not sufficient for establishing liability in cases of omissions, because culpa levissima did not presuppose the breach of a genuine legal duty.

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  5. R. Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations (paperback ed. 1996) 1043.

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  6. S. Stryk, Specimen usus moderni pandectarum (Halle 1713 ff.) lib. IX, tit. II, § 14; cf. also J. Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas (Paris 1829) lib. IX, tit. II, § 3.

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  7. See, in addition, BGH 19 February 1975, BGHZ 64, 46, 51; H. Heinrichs, in: O. Palandt (ed.), BGB (64th ed. 2005) Vorb v § 249 no. 84; G. Schiemann, in: J. von Staudinger (ed.), Kommentar zum BGB-§§ 249-254 (revised ed. 2005) § 249 no. 9. Strictly speaking the existence of a duty is not part of the concept of causation. However, in view of the abundance of potential acts which could have prevented the injury it can only meaningfully be asked whether an omission was causal, if a specific omission can be identified; and this requires the establishment of a duty to act.

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  8. H. Heinrichs, in: O. Palandt (ed.), BGB (64th ed. 2005) Vorb v § 249 no. 84. As the references in the present decision show, toppled tombstones and the duties of the respective municipalities with regard to them have given rise to a rich case-law.

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  9. For extensive commentary on the Verkehrs(sicherungs)pflichten, see G. Wagner, in: K. Rebmann/ F. J. Säcker/ R. Rixecker (eds.), Münchener Kommentar zum BGB, vol. V (4th ed. 2004) § 823 no. 220 ff., with many cases and examples.

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  10. See D. Medicus, in: J. von Staudinger (ed.), Kommentar zum BGB — §§ 243–254 (12th ed. 1983) § 249 no. 31; G. Schiemann, in: J. von Staudinger (ed.), Kommentar zum BGB — §§ 249–254 (revised ed. 2005) § 249 no. 10 f.; BGH 19 February 1975, BGHZ 64, 46, 52.

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  11. H. Koziol, Österreichisches Haftpflichtrecht, vol. I (3rd ed. 1997) no. 3/14. It is a separate issue beyond causation whether the omitted behaviour had been due under the circumstances, in which case the omission was not only causal, but also wrongful.

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  12. H. Koziol, Österreichisches Haftpflichtrecht, vol. I (3rd ed. 1997) no. 3/14, fn. 44.

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  13. Cf. the comment by G. Call, WoBl 2003/34.

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  14. R. Brehm, in: H. Hausheer (ed.), Berner Kommentar zum schweizerischen Privatrecht, Das Obligationenrecht (2nd ed. 1998) Art. 41 no. 108; K. Oftinger/E. Stark, Schweizerisches Haftpflichtrecht, vol. I (5th ed. 1995) § 3 no. 52; H. Rey, Ausservertragliches Haftpflichtrecht (3rd ed. 2003) no. 591 ff.; M. Schmid, Natürliche und adäquate Kausalität im Haftpflicht-und Sozialversicherungsrecht, in: A. Koller (ed.), Haftpflicht-und Versicherungstagung 1997 (1997) 192.

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  15. See ATF 95 II 93/96; M. Schmid, Natürliche und adäquate Kausalität im Haftpflicht-und Sozialversicherungsrecht, in: A. Koller (ed.), Haftpflicht-und Versicherungstagung 1997 (1997) 192; K. Oftinger/E. Stark, Schweizerisches Haftpflichtrecht, vol. I (5th ed. 1995) § 3 no. 54 ff. The Gefahrensatz is an unwritten legal principle in Swiss law, which helps to determine a faulty behaviour, so concluding R. Brehm in: H. Hausheer (ed.), Berner Kommentar zum schweizerischen Privatrecht, Das Obligationenrecht (2nd ed. 1998) Art. 41 no. 51 ff.

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  16. K. Oftinger/ E. Stark, Schweizerisches Haftpflichtrecht, vol. I (5th ed. 1995) § 3 no. 53, with ref. to A. Keller, Haftpflicht im Privatrecht (6th ed. 2002) 32, according to whom the infringement of a contractual obligation does not lead to liability.

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  17. See also E. Dacoronia, Greece, in: H. Koziol/ B.C. Steininger (eds.), European Tort Law 2002 (2003) 234.

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  18. AP 394/2002, EllDni 2003, 419; 1760/2001, EllDni 2002, 1352; 1653/2001, EllDni 2002, 1031; 889/2000, EllDni 2001, 387; 87/2000, EllDni 2000, 967; 1128/2000, EllDni 2001, 1282; 812/1998, EllDni 1998, 1549; 1592/1998, EllDni 1999, 147; 638/1996, EllDni 1998, 537; 692/1990, NoV 1992, 67; Athens Court of Appeal 3919/1999, EllDni 1999, 1108; 9778/1991, Arm 1992, 221; 3467/1989, NoV 1989, 1246; Piraeus Court of Appeal 116/1991, PirNom 1991, 467; Thessaloniki Court of Appeal 2518/2000, Arm 2001, 46; Thessaloniki Court of First Instance 17247/1999, Arm 2001, 199. Greek doctrine is preoccupied by omissions mainly only as far as unlawfulness is concerned. In the Greek law of torts, an omission is illegal when the omitting person has a duty to act. One has a duty to act: a) when he is obliged by law; b) when he is obliged by contract; c) when he is obliged by good faith according to the prevailing social understanding, especially when he himself has created a perilous situation. In such a case he has the obligation to take all appropriate measures to prevent damage from happening to third persons.

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  19. See also E. Dacoronia, Greece, in: H. Koziol/ B.C. Steininger (eds.), European Tort Law 2001 (2002) 272.

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  20. Court of Appeal of Antwerp, 28 June 2001, Rev Dr santé/T Gez 2003–2004, 181 ff.

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  21. See A. Wolfsbergen, Onrechtmatige Daad (1946) 19; J. van Schellen, Juridische causaliteit (1972) 175; C.C. van Dam, Aansprakelijkheid voor nalaten (1995) 41; C. Asser/A.S. Hartkamp, Verbintenissenrecht, vol. I (11th ed. 2000) no. 438; Schadevergoeding (Boonekamp) Art. 6:98, aant. 11.

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  22. See however A. Wolfsbergen, Onrechtmatige Daad (1946) 19–21; G.H.A. Schut, Rechtelijke verantwoordelijkheid en wettelijke aansprakelijkheid (1963) 73–75; J. van Schellen, Juridische causaliteit (1972) 167–179; G.H.A. Schut, Onrechtmatige daad (1997) 92–94.

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  23. On that aspect of the matter, see C.C. van Dam, Aansprakelijkheid voor nalaten (1995).

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  24. See the case note by G.J. Scholten in NJ 1974, 453.

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  25. See C. Asser/ A.S. Hartkamp, Verbintenissenrecht, vol. I (11th ed. 2000) no. 438, and Schadevergoeding (Boonekamp) Art. 6:98, aant. 11 for further case law.

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  26. See for instance I. Giesen, Bewijs en aansprakelijkheid (2001) 150, with references.

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  27. See A. Wolfsbergen, Onrechtmatige Daad (1946) 19; C.C. van Dam, Aansprakelijkheid voor nalaten (1995) 41; C. Asser/A.S. Hartkamp, Verbintenissenrecht, vol. I (11th ed. 2000) no. 438; Schadevergoeding (Boonekamp) Art. 6:98, aant. 11.

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  28. See no. 1–5 and A. Wolfsbergen, Onrechtmatige Daad (1946) 19–21.

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  29. See C. Asser/ A.S. Hartkamp, Verbintenissenrecht, vol. I (11th ed. 2000) no. 438, as well as Schadevergoeding (Boonekamp) Art. 6:98, aant. 11, for further case law, and of course no. 1–5 supra.

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  30. There is a vast amount of literature on this case and the topic it deals with, see for example: I. Giesen, Bewijslastverdeling bij beroepsaansprakelijkheid (1999) 66 ff.; I. Giesen, Bewijs en aansprakelijkheid (2001) 116 ff.; A.J. Akkermans, De omkeringsregel bij het bewijs van causaal verband (2002); D.T. Boks, Notariële aansprakelijkheid (2002) 211 ff.

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  31. See especially HR 29 November 2002, RvdW 2002, 190 (TFS/NS) and HR 29 November 2002, RvdW 2002, 191 (Kastelijn/Achtkarspelen) and on these important cases G.E. van Maanen, NTBR 2003, 111-116; Chr. H. van Dijk, TVP 2003, 7-15; T. Hartlief, AA 2003, 298-306; J.W. Rutgers, AA 2003, 307-313.

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  32. See P. Trimarchi, Causalità e danno (1967) 14. (The same causality principles apply to both acts and omissions). Cass., 28 September 2000, Baltrocchi; Cass., 29 November 2000, Musto; Cass., 28 November 2000, Di Cintio, Riv. it. dir. e proc. pen. 2001, 289, note by F. Centonze, Causalità attiva e causalità omissiva: tre rivoluzionarie sentenze della giurisprudenza di legittimità.

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  33. The case was affirmed on appeal: Cass., 31 May 2005, no. 11609 (publication of the decision in legal periodicals is forthcoming). The first instance case is: Trib. Roma, 27 November 1998, Foro it. 1999, I, 313; Danno e resp. 1999, 214, note by U. Izzo; Dir. uomo 1998, 109; Giust. civ. 1999, I, 2851, note by P. Costanzo. On contaminated blood litigation in Italy: U. Izzo, La precauzione nella responsabilità civile (2004).

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  34. The Law of 29 June 2003, no. 141, published in Gazzetta ufficiale 2003, no. 143; Danno e resp. 2003, 907, with note by U. Izzo. The proceedings under this law are open to this day.

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  35. Cass., sez. un., 19 June 1936, Giur. it. 1936, I,1, 866, note by A.C. Jemolo.

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  36. See, e.g., App. Milano, 21 October 2003, Resp. civ. prev. 2004, 165, with note by R. Caranta, La responsabilità dell’autorità vigilanza per mancato o insufficiente esercizio dei loro poteri (damages awarded to investors for financial losses caused by false prospectus information and by omissions of the Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa in the exercise of its power of supervision over the public offering of securities).

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  37. Legal scholarship considers that an omission gives rise to liability if a) there was intention to cause harm, b) there was a duty to act, either established by the law or by agreement (see R. de Ángel Yagüez, Tratado de Responsabilidad Civil (1993) 257; Díez-Picazo, Derecho de daños (1999) 289) and c) this duty to act was imposed by a “duty of solidarity or good faith” (J.L. Lacruz/F. Rivero, Elementos de Derecho civil, vol. II-2 (2nd ed. 2002) 467) or was a “conduct which could have been normally required” (de Ángel, ibid).

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  38. See L.F. Reglero Campos, El nexo causal, in: L.F. Reglero Campos (ed.), Tratado de responsabilidad civil (2nd ed. 2003) 328.

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  39. See L.F. Reglero Campos, El nexo causal, in: L.F. Reglero Campos (ed.), Tratado de responsabilidad civil (2nd ed. 2003) 331.

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  40. The Court quotes J. Antunes Varela, Das Obrigações em Geral (9th ed. 1996) 908–909 and P. Carvalho, Omissão e Dever de Agir em Direito Civil (1999) 57–58. The Supreme Courts further explains that the adequacy theory has two variations: a positive formulation (more restrictive) and a negative formulation (with a broader scope). According to the positive formulation, the fact is only the adequate cause of damage if this (damage) is a “normal”, “typical” consequence of that (fact), that is, whenever the fact takes place, one can foresee the damage as a “natural” consequence or a “probable” effect of that fact. According to the negative formulation, the fact that acted as the condition of the damage shall not be considered as being “adequate cause” only in case decisively “exceptional, abnormal, extraordinary or anomalous” circumstances are present in the particular situation. The Supreme Court adopts the negative formulation (especially when dealing with wrongful actions or omissions), which is the common opinion in case law and literature.

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  41. Expressly referring to these German academics, see, for example, Supreme Court of Justice decision of 3 February 1999, CJ (1999) I, 73.

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  42. L. Menezes Leitão, Direito das Obrigações (3rd ed. 2003) 346 also refers to this case as an example of the Adäquanzlehre in Portuguese case law.

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  43. H.L.A. Hart/ T. Honoré, Causation in the Law (2nd ed. 1985) 138–9.

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  44. But it may prevent the claimant from making out another element of the cause of action: see, e.g., Innes v Wylie (1844) 174 ER 800 (battery requiring proof of a positive act). For further discussion, see F. Milsom, Not doing is no trespass [1954] CLJ 105.

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  45. See, e.g., Reeves v Commissioner of the Police for the Metropolis [2000] 1 AC 360 (no. 5–8).

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  46. See, e.g., Bux v Slough Metals Ltd [1973] 1 WLR 1358.

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  47. Nolan v Dental Manufacturing Co [1958] 1 WLR 936.

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  48. [2000] 1 AC 360, 368.

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  49. [2000] 1 AC 360, 368.

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  50. Ibid., per Lord Hoffmann.

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  51. Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232.

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  52. See also M. Hogg, Duties of care, causation, and the implications of Chester v Afshar, (2005) 9 ELR 156.

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  53. See E. Quill, Torts in Ireland (2nd ed. 2004) 38–44 and 511–514; B.M.E. McMahon/W. Binchy, Law of Torts (3rd ed. 2000) ch. 8. A good example of this caution can be seen in Breslin v Corcoran & Motor Insurers’ Bureau of Ireland 2 ILRM 2003, 189, noted by E. Quill, Ireland, in: H. Koziol/B.C. Steininger (eds.), European Tort Law 2003 (2004) 252 f.; R. Byrne/W. Binchy, Annual Review of Irish Law 2003 (2004) 551–554. Here the Supreme Court refused to extend the motorist’s duty to a failure to remove the keys from the ignition to prevent theft of the vehicle and resultant injury to a third party, who was knocked down. It was accepted that such a duty could arise if the car was left in an area particularly notorious for car theft. Contrast Cunningham v McGrath Bros. IR 1964, 209, where the defendant left ladders unattended on a footpath causing an obstruction; a third party moved the ladders to a less obstructive location, from where they fell and injured the plaintiff; the defendants were held liable.

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  54. ILRM 1986, 312.

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  55. According to H. Ussing, Erstatningsret (1937) 146, an omission cannot be the cause of physical injury, since an omission is “nothing”. However, the author notes that if one applies a purely formal concept of a condition, an omission can be the cause of an injury.

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  56. Cf. A Vinding Kruse, Erstatningsret (2nd ed. 1989) 113 and 138 where it is argued that the concept of causation should not comprise omissions. No convincing reasons are given for this viewpoint and it is not clear what is meant by it.

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  57. B. von Eyben/ H. Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret (5th ed. 2003) 43.

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  58. See e.g. M. Hemmo, Vahingonkorvausoikeuden oppikirja (Tort Law Reader) (2002) 28, H. Saxén, Skadeståndsrätt (The Law of Torts) (1975) 41 ff., E. Routamo/P. Ståhlberg, Suomen vahingonkorvausoikeus (Finnish Tort Law) (2000) 254.

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  59. The outcome of this case differs from that of an earlier case KKO 1991:73, where 15-year-old A1 had lit the fire. A2 was considered negligent because he had taken a contributory attitude to the event by holding A1’s gloves while A1 had lit the trashcans in question.

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  63. Art. 2358 of the CLL provides: “If loss is caused by something being thrown or poured out into the street or another place where people walk or stay, or by inadequately fastened objects falling from a house onto the street” etc., a person suffering such a loss may claim compensation for the loss from a person indicated in Sec. 2359”. Art. 2359 provides “Compensation for losses shall not be claimed from the owner of the building, but from the person living in it or having, for whatever reason, possession of the building or that part of the building from which something was poured or thrown.” The Civil Law of Latvia. Translation and Terminology Center (2001) 456.

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  77. Compare also Case C-140/97 Rechberger and others v Austria [1999] ECR I-3499, which will be discussed below.

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(2007). Damage Caused by Omission. In: Essential Cases on Natural Causation. Digest of European Tort Law, vol 1. Springer, Vienna. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-211-36958-6_3

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