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On the Intersection Between Tort Law and Regulatory Law — A Comparative Analysis

  • Chapter
Book cover Tort and Regulatory Law

Part of the book series: Tort and Insurance Law ((TIL,volume 19))

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Abstract

It has been said that “regulatory law” is a vague and imprecise term encompassing various instruments of control and constraint.1 It has also been loosely defined as “any system of rules intended to govern the behaviour of its subjects”.2 In this definition, administrative law and criminal law can both be part of an overarching regulatory framework.3 Moreover, strictly speaking even private law can be part of a regulatory framework if it is used by the relevant legislative body as a means of meeting regulatory policy aims. In a more concrete and strict sense, regulatory law is said to be “a distinctive set of techniques used by states to control the operations of markets”.4 In this more narrow sense, regulation is traditionally associated with public law — administrative and/or criminal — and is considered to be the domain of government agencies vested with public law powers.5 As a result, it seems that most lawyers tend to consider regulatory law to be a body of law outside the private law domain and setting rules or standards of conduct in various social situations ranging from occupational health regulation to environmental standards and competition law. Most contributions to this book work from this assumption.6

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References

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  134. In Poland for instance, lawful performance of public authority may give rise to “equity liability”. Cf. M. Jagielska/ G. Żmij, Poland, no. 70.

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  148. U. Magnus/ K. Bitterich, Germany, no. 49. A complete bar of the farmer’s claim seems appropriate according to Austrian law; see M. Lukas, Austria, no. 48.

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  150. Note that under Polish law there is the immunity for acts and omissions dating before 1 September 2004. See M. Jagielska/ G. Żmij, Poland, no. 86.

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  1. Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands

    Willem H. van Boom (Professor of Private Law, Rotterdam Institute of Private Law)

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Willem H. van Boom Meinhard Lukas Christa Kissling

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van Boom, W.H. (2007). On the Intersection Between Tort Law and Regulatory Law — A Comparative Analysis. In: van Boom, W.H., Lukas, M., Kissling, C. (eds) Tort and Regulatory Law. Tort and Insurance Law, vol 19. Springer, Vienna. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-211-31134-9_20

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