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Calculated Security? Mathematical Modelling of Conflict and Cooperation

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Mathematics and War

Abstract

The pioneering work of Lewis Fry Richardson on modelling the arms race raised expectations that mathematics can contribute to peace and conflict resolution. Based upon Richardson’s model, various extensions are discussed, with a focus on time-discrete nonlinear models showing chaotic behavior. As a general framework for the modelling of conflict and cooperation in international security a multi-actor dynamic game is introduced, with mathematical conditions for unstable interaction, potentially leading to violent conflict, arms race and war. On the other hand, the approach provides a basis for the evolution of cooperation and coalition formation. In more detail, the case of instabilities in the offense-defense competition is discussed and the role of uncertainties in complex international relations.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Germany

    Jürgen Scheffran

Authors
  1. Jürgen Scheffran
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Studies in Mathematics and Physics and their Functions in Education, Research and Applications - IMUFA, Roskilde University, P.O. Box 260, Roskilde, 4000, Denmark

    Bernhelm Booß-Bavnbek

  2. Department of Psychology and of Philosophy and Science Studies, Roskilde University, P.O. Box 260, Roskilde, 4000, Denmark

    Jens Høyrup

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Scheffran, J. (2003). Calculated Security? Mathematical Modelling of Conflict and Cooperation. In: Booß-Bavnbek, B., Høyrup, J. (eds) Mathematics and War. Birkhäuser, Basel. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-0348-8093-0_21

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-0348-8093-0_21

  • Publisher Name: Birkhäuser, Basel

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-7643-1634-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-0348-8093-0

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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