Towards Principles of Executive Control: How Mental Sets are Selected

Abstract

Mental sets are hypothetical, representational devices that enable coherence of action over time in the face of interfering stimuli as well as flexibility of action when internal or external demands change. But: How are mental sets represented? And how are mental sets established, maintained, and changed? A significant advancement of our understanding of these issues can be expected from the rediscovery and refinement of the so-called task-switching paradigm which allows the examination of selection processes that mediate between competing mental sets. A diverse variety of task-switching phenomena has been obtained with this paradigm. However, so far, a coherent framework that accounts for these phenomena and at the same time positions set-selection processes within the broader neuro-cognitive literature is missing. The goal of this paper is twofold. In the first part, central task-switching phenomenon and issues are reviewed. In the second part a theoretical framework is sketched out that promises a unified account for the diverse set of results.