Abstract
Deception is an act whereby one person causes another person to have a false belief. This paper formulates deception using causal relations between a speaker’s utterance and a hearer’s belief states in epistemic causal logic. Four different types of deception are considered: deception by lying, deception by bluffing, deception by truthful telling, and deception by omission, depending on whether a speaker believes what he/she says or not, and whether a speaker makes an utterance or not. Next several situations are considered where an act of deceiving happens. Intentional deception is accompanied by a speaker’s intent to deceive. Indirect deception happens when false information is carried over from person to person. Self-deception is an act of deceiving the self. The current study formally characterizes various aspects of deception that have been informally argued in philosophical literature.
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Notes
- 1.
That is, \(\ell \in I\) iff \(\lnot \ell \not \in I\) for any literal \(\ell \) appearing in a theory.
- 2.
\(B_a^t \varphi \) is considered an atom such as “\(b\_a\_t\_{\varphi }\)”.
- 3.
Carson considers bluffing a type of lying and views deception by bluffing as lies that deceive. In this paper, we distinguish lying and bluffing, and view deception by bluffing as deception without lying.
- 4.
We later consider intention in deceiving.
- 5.
Here, we omit \(B_x^t\top \) and \(B_x^{t+1}\top \) where \(x=a,b\).
- 6.
The meaning of the term “intentional deception” is different from “attempted deception” in Fig. 1. Intentional deception is a type of deception that involves the success of deceiving, while this is not always the case in attempted deception.
- 7.
“In short, self-deception involves an inner conflict, perhaps the existence of contradiction” [9, p. 588].
- 8.
Jones [17] characterizes a group of “self-deception positions” consistently using KD as the logic of belief.
- 9.
McLaughlin calls it “self-induced deception”.
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Sakama, C. (2021). Deception in Epistemic Causal Logic. In: Sarkadi, S., Wright, B., Masters, P., McBurney, P. (eds) Deceptive AI. DeceptECAI DeceptAI 2020 2021. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 1296. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-91779-1_8
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