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Strategic Voting in Negotiating Teams

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Algorithmic Decision Theory (ADT 2021)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 13023))

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A negotiating team is a group of two or more agents who join together as a single negotiating party because they share a common goal related to the negotiation. Since a negotiating team is composed of several stakeholders, represented as a single negotiating party, there is need for a voting rule for the team to reach decisions. In this paper, we investigate the problem of strategic voting in the context of negotiating teams. Specifically, we present a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a manipulation for a single voter when using a positional scoring rule. We show that the problem is still tractable when there is a coalition of manipulators that uses a x-approval rule. The coalitional manipulation problem becomes computationally hard when using Borda, but we provide a polynomial-time algorithm with the following guarantee: given a manipulable instance with k manipulators, the algorithm finds a successful manipulation with at most one additional manipulator. Our results hold for both constructive and destructive manipulations.

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  1. 1.

    Our definition of a candidate’s position in a voter’s ranking is the opposite of the commonly used, and we chose it to enhance the readability of the proofs: \({pos(o,p_i)} \ge {pos(o',p_j)}\) is naturally translated to “o is ranked in \(p_i\) higher than \(o'\) is ranked in \(p_j\)”.


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This research was supported in part by the Ministry of Science, Technology & Space, Israel.

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Correspondence to Noam Hazon .

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Schmerler, L., Hazon, N. (2021). Strategic Voting in Negotiating Teams. In: Fotakis, D., Ríos Insua, D. (eds) Algorithmic Decision Theory. ADT 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 13023. Springer, Cham.

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-87755-2

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