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Obvious Manipulability of Voting Rules

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Algorithmic Decision Theory (ADT 2021)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 13023))

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The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that no unanimous and non-dictatorial voting rule is strategyproof. We revisit voting rules and consider a weaker notion of strategyproofness called not obvious manipulability that was proposed by Troyan and Morrill (2020). We identify several classes of voting rules that satisfy this notion. We also show that several voting rules including k-approval fail to satisfy this property. We characterize conditions under which voting rules are obviously manipulable. One of our insights is that certain rules are obviously manipulable when the number of alternatives is relatively large compared to the number of voters. In contrast to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, many of the rules we examined are not obviously manipulable. This reflects the relatively easier satisfiability of the notion and the zero information assumption of not obvious manipulability, as opposed to the perfect information assumption of strategyproofness. We also present algorithmic results for computing obvious manipulations and report on experiments.

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The authors thanks Anton Baychkov, Barton Lee and the anonymous reviewers of ADT 2021 for useful feedback.

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Correspondence to Alexander Lam .

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Aziz, H., Lam, A. (2021). Obvious Manipulability of Voting Rules. In: Fotakis, D., Ríos Insua, D. (eds) Algorithmic Decision Theory. ADT 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 13023. Springer, Cham.

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-87755-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-87756-9

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