The Primrose Path: Rights and Autonomy

Abstract

Rights are relationships in which the rightsholder is categorically entitled to be left alone (prerogative), to demand some kind of good or performance (claim), to be able to change the status of another (power), or to be exempt from others’ powers (immunity). Looked at ethically, rights are difficult to ground. In the real world, assertions of right tend to be based on specifics of relationships and of the type of situation involved. The existence of an ethical right is often controversial, and is unenforceable in any event. The almost infinite panoply of putative ethical rights-relationships must be reduced to legal rights. Legal rights are limited, written, enforceable, and have no justification except the legitimacy of the government that imposes and seeks to enforce them. Ethically-derived rights cannot serve as a theoretical basis for child welfare. Legal approaches generally prioritize children’s beneficent interests over their abstract rights. Among the putative rights that laws tend to deemphasize, at least in the US, is a presumed right to autonomy. Autonomy is a cluster concept that includes independence from others, choice, authenticity, etc. Empirical studies suggest that most people prioritize relationships, security, and (to a point) material well-being over autonomy. This is in contrast to much philosophical speculation. Furthermore, attention to child autonomy is often a pretext for supplanting parental values. Thus, I reject concern for autonomy as a prominent feature in settling parent-state disputes.