Skip to main content

Election Pledge Fulfilment Under Minority Government

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
How Ireland Voted 2020

Abstract

This chapter explores the pledges made by Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil at the 2016 election, measures how far these were implemented and also aims to explain why some were fulfilled and other were not. Fine Gael did fulfil more pledges, but Fianna Fáil also realised some key commitments, including some not promised by Fine Gael. Overall, the degree of pledge enactment in this minority government was similar to that by parties in a coalition in previous years, but Fine Gael did make a lot of promises which were discarded as it entered government, suggesting they may never have been serious priorities to begin with.

The authors are very grateful for the excellent research assistance provided by Frank Fitzgerald and Jadene Davis.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

eBook
USD 24.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 32.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Robert Thomson and Rory Costello, ‘Governing together in good and bad economic times: the fulfilment of election pledges in Ireland’, Irish Political Studies 31:2 (2016), pp. 182–203.

  2. 2.

    Catherine Moury and Jorge M. Fernandes, ‘Minority governments and pledge fulfilment: evidence from Portugal’, Government and Opposition 53:2 (2018), pp. 335–55.

  3. 3.

    A comparative study of pledge fulfilment across 57 governments in 12 countries found no difference between single-party majority governments and single-party minority governments in terms of pledge fulfilment rates; while parties that governed alone (either in minority or majority governments) fulfilled a significantly higher rate of pledges compared to parties that shared power in a coalition. See Robert Thomson et al., ‘The fulfillment of parties’ election pledges: A comparative study on the impact of power sharing’, American Journal of Political Science 61:3 (2017), pp. 527–42.

  4. 4.

    Kevin Doyle and Niall O’Connor, ‘How Micheál Martin won the sweetest deal in Fianna Fáil history’, Irish Independent 5 May 2016.

  5. 5.

    Rory Costello, Paul O’Neill and Robert Thomson, ‘The fulfilment of election pledges by the outgoing government’, pp. 27–45 in Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh (eds), How Ireland Voted 2016: the election that nobody won (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), p. 31.

  6. 6.

    Thomson and Costello, ‘Governing together’.

  7. 7.

    Costello, O’Neill and Thomson, ‘The fulfilment of election pledges by the outgoing government’, p. 34.

  8. 8.

    Costello, O’Neill and Thomson, ‘The fulfilment of election pledges by the outgoing government’, p. 39.

  9. 9.

    Under the constitution, a bill cannot pass into law unless the government indicates that it supports the necessary expenditure. By refusing to make any such declaration, the government was able to block the enactment of many private member’s bills.

  10. 10.

    The Irish Examiner reported that by April 2019, 114 bills had been passed by the 32nd Dáil, of which 104 were government bills. Fiachra Ó Cionnaith, ‘Opposition bills are stuck in a legislative labyrinth’, Irish Examiner 23 April 2019.

  11. 11.

    Elaine Loughlin, ‘Review of system on the cards amid criticism of “do-nothing Dáil”’, Irish Examiner 17 April 2017.

  12. 12.

    These figures exclude election years. Figures calculated from the Electronic Irish Statute Book, available: http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/ (accessed 4 May 2020).

  13. 13.

    More specifically, 83 Fine Gael pledges were in agreement with 87 Fianna Fáil pledges. The numbers are not identical because pledges can vary in scope: one broad pledge can be related to two more narrowly-focused pledges.

  14. 14.

    Fiach Kelly, ‘The full document: Fine Gael–Fianna Fáil deal for government’, Irish Times 3 May 2016.

  15. 15.

    Eoin O’Malley, ‘70 days: government formation in 2016’, pp. 255–76 in Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh (eds), How Ireland Voted 2016: the election that nobody won (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

  16. 16.

    Joseph Harrington Jr, ‘The impact of reelection pressures on the fulfillment of campaign promises’, Games and Economic Behavior 5:1 (1993), pp. 71–97.

  17. 17.

    Elin Naurin, Election Promises, Party Behaviour and Voter Perceptions (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 71. For an example of parties accusing one another of engaging in cheap talk, see Costello, O’Neill and Thomson, ‘The fulfilment of election pledges by the outgoing government’, pp. 27–8.

  18. 18.

    Thomson and Costello, ‘Governing together’, p. 199.

  19. 19.

    It is easier for voters to assign responsibility under single-party government than under a coalition. This in turn might imply that parties that expect to enter a coalition government are more likely to include pledges that they are not committed to (but might win them some votes), whereas parties that anticipate governing alone will be more careful about what they pledge, knowing that voters will hold them (and them alone) to account. This line of reasoning may explain why single-party minority governments in other countries, where they are the norm, are associated with higher rates of pledge fulfilment than we have observed for the Fine Gael government of 2016–2020. Prior to 2016, Fine Gael had never formed a single-party executive, and it was not expected to do so then. If over-pledging is something that parties do when they anticipate coalition government, then Fine Gael may have engaged in this.

  20. 20.

    The government’s Dáil strength declined from 57 to 53 between 2016 and 2019, due to the loss of Fine Gael TDs Frances Fitzgerald, Peter Fitzpatrick and Dara Murphy, as well as independent TD Denis Naughten.

  21. 21.

    This costing is available on p. 65 of a document entitled ‘Fine Gael Costings’ available on the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform’s website: https://www.gov.ie/en/collection/94a724-party-costings-for-budget-2016/ (accessed 29 May 2020).

  22. 22.

    While the rate of fulfilment for Fine Gael was higher for those pledges that were in agreement with Fianna Fáil pledges, this effect goes away when we control for other factors, such as inclusion in the programme for government.

  23. 23.

    Thomson et al., ‘The fulfillment of parties’ election pledges’, p. 535.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Rory Costello .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2021 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Costello, R., Sheridan, A., Casey, D. (2021). Election Pledge Fulfilment Under Minority Government. In: Gallagher, M., Marsh, M., Reidy, T. (eds) How Ireland Voted 2020. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66405-3_2

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics