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Conclusions and Future Research

Chapter
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Part of the Lecture Notes in Networks and Systems book series (LNNS, volume 138)

Abstract

In Chap.  2 we presented mathematically rigorous proofs of the conjectures (cf., [1]) concerning the behavior of the semi-public company and private firm of a semi-mixed duopoly of a homogeneous good. The main difference of this work from the classical duopoly models is in the presence of one producer who maximizes not its net profit, but the convex combination of the latter with the domestic social surplus.

References

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    Kalashnikov, V.V., Bulavsky, V.A., Kalashnykova, N.I., Watada, J., Hernández-Rodríguez, D.J.: Analysis of consistent equilibria in a mixed duopoly. J. Adv. Comput. Intell. Intell. Inform. 18(6), 962–970 (2014)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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    Kalashnikov, V.V., Bulavsky, V.A., Kalashnykova, N.I., Castillo-Pérez, F.J.: Mixed oligopoly with consistent conjectures. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 210(3), 729–735 (2011)MathSciNetCrossRefGoogle Scholar
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    Kalashnikov, V.V., Bulavsky, V.A., Kalashnykova, N.I., López-Ramos, F.: Consistent conjectures are optimal Cournot-Nash strategies in the meta-game. Optimization 66(12), 2007–2024 (2017)MathSciNetCrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Physics and MathematicsUniversidad Autoonoma de Nuevo LéonSan Nicolas de los GarzaMexico
  2. 2.Department of Systems and Industrial EngineeringTecnologico de Monterrey ITESM/Campus MonterreyMonterreyMexico
  3. 3.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of Texas at El PasoEl PasoUSA

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