Consistent Conjectural Variations Coincide with the Nash Solution in the Meta-Model

Part of the Lecture Notes in Networks and Systems book series (LNNS, volume 138)


Consider an oligopoly of at least two producers of a homogeneous good with cost functions \(f_i=f_i(q_i)\), \(i=1,\dots ,n\), \(n\ge 2\), where \(q_i\ge 0\) is the supply by producer i. Consumers’ demand is described by a demand function \(G=G(p)\), whose argument p is the market price established by a cleared market.


  1. 1.
    Bulavsky, V.A.: Structure of demand and equilibrium in a model of oligopoly. Econ. Math. Methods (Ekonomika i Matematicheskie Metody) 33, 112–134 (1997). In RussianGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    Kalashnykova, N.I., Bulavsky, V.A., Kalashnikov, V.V.: Consistent conjectures as optimal nash strategies in the upper level game. ICIC Express Lett. 6(4), 965–970 (2012)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Kalashnikov, V.V., Bulavsky, V.A., Kalashnykova, N.I., López-Ramos, F.: Consistent conjectures are optimal Cournot-Nash strategies in the meta-game. Optimization 66(12), 2007–2024 (2017)MathSciNetCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    Kalashnikov, V.V., Bulavsky, V.A., Kalashnykova, N.I., Castillo-Pérez, F.J.: Mixed oligopoly with consistent conjectures. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 210(3), 729–735 (2011)MathSciNetCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. 5.
    Liu, Y.F., Ni, Y.X., Wu, F.F., Cai, B.: Existence and uniqueness of consistent conjectural variation equilibrium in electricity markets. Int. J. Electr. Power Energy Syst. 29(6), 455–461 (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. 6.
    Isac, G., Bulavsky, V.A., Kalashnikov, V.V.: Complementarity, Equilibrium, Efficiency and Economics. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Physics and MathematicsUniversidad Autoonoma de Nuevo LéonSan Nicolas de los GarzaMexico
  2. 2.Department of Systems and Industrial EngineeringTecnologico de Monterrey ITESM/Campus MonterreyMonterreyMexico
  3. 3.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of Texas at El PasoEl PasoUSA

Personalised recommendations