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Open-Loop Based Strategies for Autonomous Linear Quadratic Game Models with Continuous Updating

  • Ildus Kuchkarov
  • Ovanes PetrosianEmail author
Conference paper
  • 196 Downloads
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 12095)

Abstract

The class of differential games with continuous updating is quite new, there it is assumed that at each time instant, players use information about the game structure (motion equations and payoff functions of players) defined on a closed time interval with a fixed duration. As time goes on, information about the game structure updates. A linear-quadratic case for this class of games is particularly important for practical problems arising in the engineering of human-machine interaction. In this paper, it is particularly interesting that the open-loop strategies are used to construct the optimal ones, but subsequently, we obtain strategies in the feedback form. Using these strategies the notions of Shapley value and Nash equilibrium as optimality principles for cooperative and non-cooperative cases respectively are defined and the optimal strategies for the linear-quadratic case are presented.

Keywords

Differential games with continuous updating Nash equilibrium Linear quadratic differential games 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.St. Petersburg State UniversitySaint-PetersburgRussia
  2. 2.School of Mathematics and StatisticsQingdao UniversityQingdaoPeople’s Republic of China

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