Free Will and Indeterminism

  • Danny Frederick
Part of the Palgrave Studies in Classical Liberalism book series (PASTCL)


After a brief historical introduction to the problem of free will I explain the simple theory of free will as an undetermined act. The popular claim that free will, so understood, is incoherent arises from a failure to distinguish acts from other events. I employ action theory to explain some complications of free action. I dispose of some objections, including those from Frankfurt-type cases and the infinite regress arguments of H. A. Prichard and Gilbert Ryle. I give a brief indication of the confusions endemic to contemporary philosophical discussions of free will to be found in Roderick Chisholm, Donald Davidson, Laura Ekstrom, John Martin Fischer, Harry Frankfurt, Robert Kane, Hugh McCann, Alfred Mele, Robert Nozick, Helen Steward, Richard Taylor and many others. I conclude by noting or commenting on some outstanding questions including the problem of addictions and compulsions.


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© The Author(s) 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  • Danny Frederick
    • 1
  1. 1.Independent ScholarYeovilUK

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