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Theories, Models and Mechanisms

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Corporate Governance and Organisational Performance

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Abstract

This chapter outlines the development of Corporate Governance discipline and provides a review of the central theories concerned with the Corporate Governance. The chapter compares and contrasts a number of theoretical frameworks and mechanisms, both internal and external, that are adopted in this study in an effort to understand the relationship between the structure of corporate Boards and their links with firm performance.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. London, UK

    Naeem Tabassum

  2. Dubai Business School, University of Dubai, Dubai, United Arab Emirates

    Dr. Satwinder Singh

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  1. Naeem Tabassum
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Correspondence to Naeem Tabassum .

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Tabassum, N., Singh, S. (2020). Theories, Models and Mechanisms. In: Corporate Governance and Organisational Performance. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48527-6_2

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