Abstract
In this chapter, we discuss the implications of the phenomenon of the implicit de se for the model of interpretation of natural language. In particular, we demonstrate that, if we wish to account for the implicit de se while maintaining that the first-person is a referring term, we must submit to the idea that the first-person refers to a Cartesian ego. This, however, corresponds to introducing objects of an ontologically subjective nature in the model of interpretation of natural language and, therefore, to rejecting semantic externalism. As an alternative, we illustrate Anscombe’s view of the first-person as a non-referring term.
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Fiorin, G., Delfitto, D. (2020). Meaning and Ontological Subjectivity. In: Beyond Meaning: A Journey Across Language, Perception and Experience. Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology, vol 25. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46317-5_29
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46317-5_29
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