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Part of the book series: Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology ((PEPRPHPS,volume 25))

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Abstract

In this chapter, we introduce a definition of the notion of self-acquaintance that is based on the notion of acquaintance, which, in turn, is based on Russell’s distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. We rely on such definition to enrich Kaplan’s two-dimensional semantics so that it can capture the cognitive dimensions expressed by de se propositions.

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Fiorin, G., Delfitto, D. (2020). Meaning and Acquaintance. In: Beyond Meaning: A Journey Across Language, Perception and Experience. Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology, vol 25. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46317-5_24

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