Abstract
With this chapter, we introduce the discussion of subjectivity in language. Wittgenstein’s private language argument demonstrates the logical impossibility of a language that is about private objects. Yet, it an intuition shared by most natural language speakers that language can be used, in practice, also to refer to their inner psychological lives. We briefly illustrate Wittgenstein’s position on the matter and, in preparation to the upcoming chapters, establish a definition of the notion of subjectivity.
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Fiorin, G., Delfitto, D. (2020). Meaning and Subjectivity. In: Beyond Meaning: A Journey Across Language, Perception and Experience. Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology, vol 25. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46317-5_20
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46317-5_20
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