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Part of the book series: Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology ((PEPRPHPS,volume 25))

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Abstract

In this chapter, we introduce the thesis of semantic externalism—the thesis, that is, that meaning is an object that belongs to the word of material things and, therefore, is not an object of a psychological nature.

We present the thesis by illustrating two of the most notable arguments in its support. The first is the so-called private language argument, originally formulated by Ludwig Wittgenstein. The second is the Twin Earth thought experiment by Hilary Putnam. Both arguments contend to demonstrate that the meaning of linguistic expressions is ultimately a function of the material circumstances in which those expressions occur.

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Fiorin, G., Delfitto, D. (2020). Meaning and World. In: Beyond Meaning: A Journey Across Language, Perception and Experience. Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology, vol 25. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46317-5_16

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