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Abstract

Moral psychology has been defined as “the study of human thought and behavior in ethical contexts”. The rational nature of morality has been questioned by some moral psychologists who believe emotions are the force behind morality; they claim we create rational justifications to explain what are essentially emotionally driven confabulations.

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Correspondence to David Steinberg .

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Steinberg, D. (2020). Moral Psychology. In: The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied Ethics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45680-1_5

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