Abstract
Self-identity is not constituted by more or less accurate facts or truth about ourselves, but is configured presentation to ourselves and others. It is the committed and promised narrative fiction patched up out of the porous existence, rather than the truth we discover. Self-identity is intentionally and attentionally forged, through imaginative narrativity, in response to the demand of the questions “Who are you?” and “Who am I?” It is called out at the intersubjective intersection as a commitment and promise.
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Zhao, G. (2020). Self-Identity and Narrative Imagination. In: Subjectivity and Infinity. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45590-3_17
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45590-3_17
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