Abstract
This chapter introduces the claim that, even though political decisions can be right and wrong, and even though there are experts in politics, we should not give greater political authority to any specific group of citizens. This can be claimed only if one adopts a non-monistic account of political legitimacy, such as Estlund’s standard account of epistemic democracy, which I endorse and defend in this book. The chapter proceeds by analyzing how various forms of democratic decision-making meet the criteria set by Estlund and concludes that aggregative democracy should be rejected in favor of deliberative democracy.
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Cerovac, I. (2020). Epistemic Democracy. In: Epistemic Democracy and Political Legitimacy. Palgrave Studies in Ethics and Public Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44602-4_5
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