Abstract
Can political decisions we make be right or wrong, or true or false? Are they just the expression of our personal interests, and consequently have no truth value? If they can be true or false, are there people who are better at getting it right or wrong? And if there are, does this imply that those who are better in making correct decisions should have political authority over others? These are some of the key questions I try to answer in this book.
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Cerovac, I. (2020). Introduction. In: Epistemic Democracy and Political Legitimacy. Palgrave Studies in Ethics and Public Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44602-4_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44602-4_1
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