Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Public Policy as the Political Calculation of Economic Value

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Macroeconomics as Systems Theory

  • 575 Accesses

Abstract

This chapter extends the examination of entangled political economy in the preceding chapter to recognition that what is commonly described as public policy reflects a form of profit-seeking that is unique to political enterprises. Any public policy seeks to alter the structure of market prices in some fashion. Those changes, moreover, respond to political calculations of economic valuations by politically relevant entities. Political action reflects the same forces and processes as economizing action. Political environments are dominated by non-logical action, which promotes an ideological veneer that hides the peculiar form of profit-seeking that political enterprises pursue.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 89.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 119.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 119.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  • Acemoglu, D., and J.A. Robinson. 2009. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Acocella, N. 1998. The Foundations of Economic Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alchian, A.A. 1950. Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory. Journal of Political Economy 58: 211–21.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Alchian, A.A., and H. Demsetz. 1972. Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization. American Economic Review 62: 777–95.

    Google Scholar 

  • Allen, J.F., Henry A. Kautz, Richard N. Pelavin, and Josh D. Tenenberg. 1991. Reasoning About Plans. San Mateo, CA: Morgan Kaufman.

    Google Scholar 

  • Aydinonat, N.E. 2008. The Invisible Hand in Economics. London: Routledge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Belloc, H. 1912. The Servile State. London: Foulis.

    Google Scholar 

  • Berger, P., and T. Luckmann. 1966. The Social Construction of Reality. New York: Random House.

    Google Scholar 

  • Boettke, P.J. 2012. Living Economics. Oakland, CA: Independent Institute.

    Google Scholar 

  • Boulding, K.E. 1956. The Image: Knowledge in Life and Society. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan, J.M. 1969. Cost and Choice. Chicago: Markham.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan, J.M., and G. Tullock. 1962. The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Candela, R., and R.E. Wagner. 2016. Vilfredo Pareto’s Theory of Action: An Alternative to Behavioral Economics. Il Pensiero Economico Italiano 24: 15–29.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chaitin, G., F.A. Doria, and N.C.A. de Costa. 2011. Gödl’s Way: Exploration into an Undecidable World. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Collins, R. 1998. The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • DeCanio, S. 2013. Limits of Economic and Social Knowledge. Houndsmill, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • de Tocqueville, A. 1835–1840 [1966]. Democracy in America, 2 vols. New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House.

    Google Scholar 

  • Devereaux, A., and Wagner, R.E. 2020. Game Theory as Social Theory: Finding Spontaneous Order. Manuscript, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ealy, R.T. 1889. Social Aspects of Christianity and Other Essays. New York: Crowell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Elias, N. 1939 [1991]. The Society of Individuals. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Epstein, J.M. (ed.). 2006. Generative Social Science: Studies in Agent-based Computational Modeling. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eusepi, G., and R.E. Wagner. 2017. Public Debt: An Illusion of Democratic Political Economy. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Fama, E. 1980. Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. Journal of Political Economy 88: 288–307.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hayek, F.A. 1937. Economics and Knowledge. Economica 4: 33–54.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hayek, F.A. 1945. The Use of Knowledge in Society. American Economic Review 35: 519–30.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hayek, F.A. 1948. Individualism and Economic Order. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hayek, F.A. 1989. The Pretense of Knowledge. American Economic Review 79: 3–7.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kastner, R.E. 2015. Understanding Our Unseen Reality: Solving Quantum Riddles. London: Imperial College Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Knight, F.H. 1947. Freedom and Reform. New York: Harper.

    Google Scholar 

  • Knight, F.H. 1960. Intelligence and Democratic Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Koppl, R. 2002. Big Players and the Economic Theory of Expectations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Koppl, R. 2018. Expert Failure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lovejoy, A. 1936. The Great Chain of Being. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Meckling, W.H., and M.C. Jensen. 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3: 305–60.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mosca, G. 1947. Elementi di scienza politica, 4th ed. Bari: G. Laterza.

    Google Scholar 

  • Niskanen, W.A. 1971. Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Chicago: Aldine.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nutter, G.W. 1962. Growth of Industrial Production in the Soviet Union. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pareto, V. 1935. The Mind and Society. New York: Harcourt Brace.

    Google Scholar 

  • Patrick, M., and R.E. Wagner. 2015. From Mixed Economy to Entangled Political Economy: A Paretian Social-theoretic Orientation. Public Choice 164: 103–16.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Persson, T., and G. Tabellini. 2000. Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Podemska-Mikluch, M., and R.E. Wagner. 2013. Dyads, Triads, and the Theory of Exchange: Between Liberty and Coercion. Review of Austrian Economics 26: 171–82.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Polanyi, M. 1958. Personal Knowledge. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Polya, G. 1954. Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning, 2 vols. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rajagopalan, S., and R.E. Wagner. 2013. Constitutional Craftsmanship and the Rule of Law. Constitutional Political Economy 24: 295–309.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rauschenbusch, W. 1917. Theology of the Social Gospel. New York: Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Resnick, M. 1994. Turtles, Termites, and Traffic Jams. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schmitt, C. 1932 [1996]. The Concept of the Political. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Simmel, G. 1900 [1990]. The Philosophy of Money, 2nd ed. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, V. 2008. Rationality in Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Storr, V. 2008. The Market as a Social Space. Review of Austrian Economics 21: 135–50.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Storr, V. 2013. Understanding the Culture of Markets. London: Routledge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Tinbergen, J. 1952. On the Theory of Economic Policy. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tollison, R.D. 1986. Economists as the Subject of Economic Inquiry. Southern Economic Journal 52: 909–22.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tollison, R.D., and R.E. Wagner. 1991. Romance, Realism, and Economic Reform. Kyklos 44: 57–70.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wagner, R.E. 2007. Fiscal Sociology and the Theory of Public Finance. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Wagner, R.E. 2012a. The Social Construction of Theoretical Landscapes: Some Economics of Economic Theories. American Journal of Economics and Sociology 71: 1185–1204.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wagner, R.E. 2012b. Viennese Kaleidics: Why It’s Liberty More than Policy That Calms Turbulence. Review of Austrian Economics 25: 283–97.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wagner, R.E. 2016. Politics as a Peculiar Business. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Wagner, R.E., and D. Yazigi. 2014. Form vs. Substance in Selection Through Competition: Elections, Markets, and Political Economy. Public Choice 159: 503–14.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Walras, L. 1874 [1954]. Elements of Pure Economics. Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weaver, W. 1948. Science and Complexity. American Scientist 36: 536–44.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wittman, D. 1995. The Myth of Democratic Failure. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA

    Richard E. Wagner

Authors
  1. Richard E. Wagner
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Richard E. Wagner .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2020 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Wagner, R.E. (2020). Public Policy as the Political Calculation of Economic Value. In: Macroeconomics as Systems Theory. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44465-5_7

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44465-5_7

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-44464-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-44465-5

  • eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation