Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Entangled Political Economy Within Human Population Systems

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Macroeconomics as Systems Theory

  • 531 Accesses

Abstract

This chapter explores the systemic or macro properties of a society where political and economic activities and organizations are thoroughly entangled with one another. In the presence of entanglement, politics is a peculiar form of commerce just as commerce is engaged with politics. Political arrangements emerge from the same economizing desires as do commercial arrangements. While political participation in economic activity is widely advocated as being necessary to stabilize what would otherwise be economic volatility, this chapter examines how the democratic competition for political power can generate economic instability, and with that very instability being used ideologically to justify further political participation in economic activity.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 89.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 119.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 119.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  • Akerman, J. 1947. Political Economic Cycles. Kyklos 1: 107–17.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Alesina, A., and N. Roubini. 1992. Political Cycles in OECD Economies. Review of Economic Studies 59: 663–88.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barabási, A.L. 2002. Linked: The New Science of Networks. Cambridge, MA: Perseus Publishing.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barro, R.J. 1974. Are Government Bonds Net Wealth? Journal of Political Economy 82: 1095–18.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bergson, H. 1911. Creative Evolution. New York: Henry Holt.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Besley, T. 2006. Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bilo, S., and R.E. Wagner. 2015. Neutral Money: Historical Fact or Analytical Artifact? Review of Austrian Economics 28: 139–50.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boettke, P.J. 2007. Liberty vs. Power in Economic Policy in the 20th and 21st Centuries. Journal of Private Enterprise 22: 7–36.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bueno de Mesquita, B., et al. 2003. The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Burnham, J. 1943. The Machiavellians. New York: John Day.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dekker, E. 2016. The Viennese Students of Civilization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Dopfer, K., J. Foster, and J. Potts. 2004. Micro-Meso-Macro. Journal of Evolutionary Economics 14: 263–279.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Drazen, A. 2000. Political Economy in Macroeconomics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Elias, N. 1939 [1991]. The Society of Individuals. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Epstein, R.A. 1993. Bargaining with the State. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Epstein, J.M. (ed.). 2006. Generative Social Science: Studies in Agent-Based Computational Modeling. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eusepi, G., and R.E. Wagner. 2017. Public Debt: An Illusion of Democratic Political Economy. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Feiwel, G.R. 1974. Reflections on Kalecki’s Theory of Political Business Cycle. Kyklos 27: 21–48.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fried, C. 1981. Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Forte, F., and J.M. Buchanan. 1961. The Evaluation of Public Services. Journal of Political Economy 69: 107–21.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Garrison, R. 2000. Time and Money: The Macroeconomics of Capital Structure. London: Routledge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Georgescu-Roegen, G. 1971. The Entropy Law and the Economic Process. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Grice-Hutchinson, M. 1978. Early Economic Thought in Spain, 1177–1749. London: Allen & Unwin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grossman, H.I. 1975. Tobin on Macroeconomics: A Review Article. Journal of Political Economy 83: 829–48.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hibbs, D.A. 1987. The American Political Economy: Macroeconomics and Electoral Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jacobs, J. 1992. Systems of Survival. New York: Random House.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kalecki, M. 1943. Political Aspects of Full Employment. Political Quarterly 14: 322–31.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Keech, W.R. 1995. Economic Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Lakatos, I. 1970. Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs. In Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, ed. I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, 91–196. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Latsis, S. (ed.). 1976. Method and Appraisal in Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leijonhufvud, A. 1981. Information and Coordination. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maine, H.S. 1861. Ancient Law. London: John Murray.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mankiw, N.G. 2006. The Macroeconomist as Scientist and Engineer. Journal of Economic Perspectives 20: 29–46.

    Google Scholar 

  • Newberg, A., E. D’Aquili, and V. Rause. 2001. Why God Won’t Go Away: Brain Science and the Biology of Belief. New York: Ballantine.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nordhaus, W.D. 1975. The Political Business Cycle. Review of Economic Studies 42: 169–90.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ostrom, V. 1984. Why Governments Fail: An Inquiry into the Use of Instruments of Evil to Do Good. In Theory of Public Choice II, ed. J.M. Buchanan and R.D. Tollison, 422–35. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ostrom, V. 1996. Faustian Bargains. Constitutional Political Economy 7: 303–308.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Persson, T., and G. Tabellini. 2000. Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Potts, J. 2000. The New Evolutionary Microeconomics. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

    Google Scholar 

  • Potts, J., and K. Morrison. 2007. Meso Comes to Markets. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 63: 307–12.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Prigogine, I. 1997. The End of Certainty: Time, Chaos, and the New Laws of Nature. New York: Free Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Resnick, M. 1994. Turtles, Termites, and Traffic Jams. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Selgin, G., and L.H. White. 1999. A Fiscal Theory of Government’s Role in Money. Economic Inquiry 37: 154–65.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Seater, J.J. 1993. Ricardian Equivalence. Journal of Economic Literature 31: 142–90.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, A., R.E. Wagner, and B. Yandle. 2011. A Theory of Entangled Political Economy with Application to TARP and NRA. Public Choice 148: 45–66.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stigler, G.J., and G.S. Becker. 1977. Die Gustibus non est Disputandum. American Economic Review 67: 76–90.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wagner, R.E. 2001. Politics and the Macro Economy. In The Elgar Companion to Public Choice, ed. F.William Shughart II and Laura Razzolini, 422–39. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wagner, R.E. 2007. Fiscal Sociology and the Theory of Public Finance. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Wagner, R.E. 2010. Mind, Society, and Human Action: Time and Knowledge in a Theory of Social Economy. London: Routledge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Wagner, R.E. 2016. Politics as a Peculiar Business: Insights from a Theory of Entangled Political Economy. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • White, L.H. 1999. The Theory of Monetary Institutions. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Willett, T.D. 1988. Political Business Cycles: The Political Economy of Money, Inflation, and Unemployment. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA

    Richard E. Wagner

Authors
  1. Richard E. Wagner
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Richard E. Wagner .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2020 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Wagner, R.E. (2020). Entangled Political Economy Within Human Population Systems. In: Macroeconomics as Systems Theory. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44465-5_6

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44465-5_6

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-44464-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-44465-5

  • eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation