Short Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge for Lattice-Based Commitment

Abstract

Commitment scheme, together with zero-knowledge proof, is a fundamental tool for cryptographic design. Recently, Baum et al. proposed a commitment scheme (BDLOP), which is by far the most efficient lattice-based one and has been applied on several latest constructions of zero-knowledge proofs. In this paper, we propose a more efficient zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for BDLOP commitment opening with a shorter proof. There are a few technical challenges, and we develop some new techniques: First, we make an adaption of BDLOP commitment by evaluating the opening with the singular value rather than $\ell _2$ norm in order to get compact parameters. Then, we try to use the bimodal Gaussian technique to minimize the size of the proof. Finally, utilizing a modulus-switch technique, we can retain the size of the commitment.

Keywords

A Discussion on Protocol of [3] with Compression Technique

The proof $\mathbf{z}$ of zero-knowledge proof of opening in [3] contains two part: $\mathbf{z}^{(1)}$ corresponds to the proof that gets multiplied by the identity matrix of public matrix $\mathbf{A}_1$ and $\mathbf{z}^{(2)}$ corresponds to the proof that gets multiplied by $\mathbf{A}_1'$. The compression technique [2] is to discard $\mathbf{z}^{(1)}$ totally and the verifier merely checks an approximate equality, i.e. an equality of high-order part.

For an inter x with $x=\lceil x\rceil _{\gamma }\cdot 2^{\gamma }+[x]_{\gamma }$, we denote $\lceil x\rceil _{\gamma }$ as the high-order bits and $[x]_{\gamma }=x \bmod 2^{\gamma }$ as the low-order $\gamma$ bits. The challenge space is $\mathcal {C}'=\{\mathbf{d}\in \mathcal {R}_q|\Vert \mathbf{d}\Vert _{\infty }=1, \Vert \mathbf{d}\Vert _1=\kappa \}$. The improved protocol $\varPi _{com}$ of [3] with compression technique [2] is given in Table 3, which satisfies the property of completeness, special soundness and honest-verifier zero-knowledge. Since honest-verifier zero-knowledge property is not affected and will hold as [3] has shown, we only discuss the completeness and special soundness of $\varPi _{com}$.

Table 3. Improved zero-knowledge proof of knowledge in [3].

Completeness: It is guaranteed by $\mathbf{A}'_1\mathbf{z}-\mathbf{d}{} \mathbf{c}_1=\mathbf{t}-\mathbf{d}{} \mathbf{r}_1$ and $\lceil \mathbf{t}-\mathbf{d}{} \mathbf{r}_1 \rceil _{\gamma }=\lceil \mathbf{t}\rceil _{\gamma }$ when $[\mathbf{t}-\mathbf{d}{} \mathbf{r}_1]_{\gamma } < \frac{\gamma }{2}-\max _{\mathbf{d},\mathbf{r}_1}\Vert \mathbf{d}{} \mathbf{r}_1\Vert _2$ holds, which brings an additional abort condition. Thus, adopting an wide-accepted assumption that the low-order bits are uniformly distributed modulo $\gamma$, the non-abort probability is approximately $(\frac{2(\frac{\gamma }{2}-\max _{\mathbf{d},\mathbf{r}_1}\Vert \mathbf{d}{} \mathbf{r}_1\Vert _2)-1}{\gamma })^N$, which means the larger $\gamma$ is, the larger non-abort probability we can get.

Special Soundness: Given a commitment $\mathbf{c}$ and two valid transcripts $(\mathbf{t},\mathbf{d},\mathbf{z}),(\mathbf{t},\mathbf{d}',\mathbf{z}')$, we can extract a valid opening of commitment $\mathbf{c}$ as follows.

$$\begin{aligned}&\lceil \mathbf{A}'_1\mathbf{z}-\mathbf{d}{} \mathbf{c}_1 \rceil _{\gamma }=\lceil \mathbf{t}\rceil _{\gamma } \end{aligned}$$

(11)

$$\begin{aligned}&\lceil \mathbf{A}'_1\mathbf{z}'-\mathbf{d}'{} \mathbf{c}_1 \rceil _{\gamma }=\lceil \mathbf{t}\rceil _{\gamma } \end{aligned}$$

(12)

Therefore, there exist two low-order term $\mathbf{e},\mathbf{e}'$ with $\Vert \mathbf{e}\Vert _{\infty },\Vert \mathbf{e}'\Vert _{\infty }\le \frac{\gamma }{2}$, such that

$$\begin{aligned}&\mathbf{A}'_1\mathbf{z}-\mathbf{d}{} \mathbf{c}_1 =\lceil \mathbf{t}\rceil _{\gamma }\cdot 2^{\gamma }+\mathbf{e} \end{aligned}$$

(13)

$$\begin{aligned}&\mathbf{A}'_1\mathbf{z}'-\mathbf{d}'{} \mathbf{c}_1=\lceil \mathbf{t}\rceil _{\gamma }\cdot 2^{\gamma }+\mathbf{e}' \end{aligned}$$

(14)

From Eqs. (13) and (14), we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{A}_1'(\mathbf{z}-\mathbf{z}')-(\mathbf{d}-\mathbf{d}')\mathbf{c}_1=\mathbf{e}-\mathbf{e}', \end{aligned}$$

(15)

and it yields

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{A}_1\left( \begin{array}{c} \mathbf{e}-\mathbf{e}' \\ \mathbf{z}-\mathbf{z}'\\ \end{array}\right) =(\mathbf{d}-\mathbf{d}')\mathbf{c}_1 \end{aligned}$$

(16)

Notice that $\Vert \mathbf{e}-\mathbf{e}'\Vert _{\infty }\le \gamma$. Assuming $\gamma \le 4\sigma$, we have $\Vert \mathbf{e}-\mathbf{e}'\Vert _2\le 4\sigma \sqrt{N}$. Set $\mathbf{f}=\mathbf{d}-\mathbf{d}'$, $\mathbf{r}=\left( \begin{array}{c} \mathbf{e}-\mathbf{e}' \\ \mathbf{z}-\mathbf{z}'\\ \end{array}\right)$ and $\mathbf{x}=\mathbf{c}_2-\mathbf{f}^{-1}{} \mathbf{A}_2\mathbf{r}$. Then $(\mathbf{x},\mathbf{r},\mathbf{f})$ is a valid opening⁵ of commitment $\mathbf{c}$ in [3].

Now we claim there is a trade-off between the reduced proof size, non-abort probability and security for $\varPi _{\text {com}}$. When instantiating the protocol $\varPi _{\text {com}}$, we have to consider the non-abort probability $(\frac{2(\frac{\gamma }{2}-\max _{\mathbf{d},\mathbf{r}_1}\Vert \mathbf{d}{} \mathbf{r}_1\Vert _2)-1}{\gamma })^N$ for completeness and condition $\gamma \le 4\sigma$ for special soundness. An observation is that the non-abort probability is $3.7\times 10^{-4}$ with $\sigma \approx 27000$ and $\gamma \approx 108000$ under the parameter in [3] (Set I-[3] in Table 2). Thus, it is inevitable to expand $\sigma$ for a practical non-abort probability. If we choose the non-abort probability $(\frac{2(\frac{\gamma }{2}-\max _{\mathbf{d},\mathbf{r}_1}\Vert \mathbf{d}{} \mathbf{r}_1\Vert _2)-1}{\gamma })^N\approx 0.3$, then Gaussian parameter $\sigma$ should be 6.3$\times$ larger than before, which may result in a weaker SIS problem. In fact, the root Hermite factor of SIS increases to 1.0047, though the proof size can be reduced to 5KB under the expanded $\sigma$. Thus, it seems such improvement with compression technique is possible but at the cost of low non-abort probability or security.