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Untangling Header Bidding Lore

Some Myths, Some Truths, and Some Hope

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Passive and Active Measurement (PAM 2020)

Abstract

Header bidding (HB) is a relatively new online advertising technology that allows a content publisher to conduct a client-side (i.e., from within the end-user’s browser), real-time auction for selling ad slots on a web page. We developed a new browser extension for Chrome and Firefox to observe this in-browser auction process from the user’s perspective. We use real end-user measurements from 393,400 HB auctions to (a) quantify the ad revenue from HB auctions, (b) estimate latency overheads when integrating with ad exchanges and discuss their implications for ad revenue, and (c) break down the time spent in soliciting bids from ad exchanges into various factors and highlight areas for improvement. For the users in our study, we find that HB increases ad revenue for web sites by \(28\%\) compared to that in real-time bidding as reported in a prior work. We also find that the latency overheads in HB can be easily reduced or eliminated and outline a few solutions, and pitch the HB platform as an opportunity for privacy-preserving advertising.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The lack of any formal specification or standardization process makes it difficult to nail down the exact time header bidding was introduced.

  2. 2.

    Ad exchanges and advertisers are also collectively referred to as buyers.

  3. 3.

    For more details on data brokers, we refer the reader to [4, 47].

  4. 4.

    Appendix C presents additional results on factors that may influence the number of exchanges contacted by a publisher.

  5. 5.

    We geolocate the end-user’s IP address when the extension reports the opt-in data.

  6. 6.

    https://majestic.com/reports/majestic-million.

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Correspondence to Waqar Aqeel , Debopam Bhattacherjee or Balakrishnan Chandrasekaran .

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Appendices

A Client-Side TFO Adoption

In this appendix, we complement the observations on server-side TFO adoption (in Sect. 6.1) with some comments on adoption on the client side. Measuring TFO adoption on the client side is challenging. The Linux kernel disables TFO globally if it sees 3 consecutive TCP timeouts, before or after the handshake, for any destination [13]. The rationale is to avoid the extra cost of TFO failure or client blacklisting in case of middlebox interference [25]. macOS implements a similar backoff strategy and disables TFO [5], although it is a bit less conservative. Windows implements an even more conservative backoff strategy [7]. Even if the operating system has TFO enabled, the browser usually does not. The Chromium project, on which Google Chrome and some other browsers are based, has removed TFO from all platforms [14], while Firefox supports TFO, but keeps it disabled by default.

B NA and EU Users: GDPR, Ad-Worthiness and Latencies

Fig. 7.
figure 7

Impact of a user’s location on (a) the number of exchanges contacted, (b) the mean CPM obtained per web page, and (c) bid-request durations.

In this appendix, we examine the role that user location plays in HB. We coarsely divided our users into regions of North America (NA), Europe (EU), Asia (AS), and Oceania (OC), we observe that web sites contact more ad exchanges in North America: \(13\%\) of web sites, when visited by users in North America, contact 8 or more ad exchanges, but in case of EU users \(99\%\) web sites contact at most 7 (Fig. 7a). Perhaps this effect can be attributed to the strict privacy requirements of GDPR. The difference between European and North American users is even more pronounced when it comes to bid amounts (or CPMs). Web sites generate 4 times more CPM through a visit from a North American user than they do from a European user as shown in Fig. 7b. It is hard to conclusively determine the reason for this large difference as there are a multitude of factors that determine the “ad-worthiness” of a user.

The CDF of on-the-wire bid durations for users in different regions (Fig. 7c) shows that, in the \(80^{\text {th}}\) percentile, European (EU) users observe \(12\%\) higher bid durations than North American (NA) users. The auction durations for NA users are, however, \(27\%\) longer than that of their EU counterparts in the \(80^{\text {th}}\) percentile (Fig. 8a). These observations can perhaps be attributed to NA users contacting more exchanges, and that, as we have seen earlier in Fig. 3c, increases auction duration. Bid durations for Oceania (OC) users are alarmingly high: \(23\%\) of bids take longer than 1 s (Fig. 7c), which precipitates in long auctions for OC users (Fig. 8a). Only \(7\%\) auctions of OC users take, however, longer than 2.5 s compared to \(10\%\) of auctions in case of NA users. For a large fraction of OC users, even though bids arrive late, the JavaScript perhaps times out and terminates the auction, potentially introducing some loss of ad revenue for publishers.

C Popularity Correlations

We investigate, in this appendix, how the popularity ranking of a web site affects its HB implementation and the CPM it receives on its ad slots. For popularity rankings, we used the Tranco list [38], a stable top list hardened against manipulation. We used the relative ranks of second-level domains observed in our measurements and filtered out web sites that have fewer than 10 data points.

Fig. 8.
figure 8

(a) Impact of user’s location on auction duration, and the impact of a web-site’s ranking on (b) mean CPM and (c) number of exchanges contacted.

Figure 8b shows the mean CPM per web-page visit, of a given web site, as a function of that site’s relative Tranco rank. The linear fit, with a slope of 0.008, reveals a weak correlation, suggesting that web-site popularity is not a strong indicator of “high-value” audience for advertisers. For instance, imgur.com (rank 51), an image-sharing web site outranks wsj.com (rank 152), a major business-focused publication.

Increasing the number of ad exchanges contacted increases the auction duration, which may have implications for end-users’ browsing experiences (refer Sect. 5). Figure 8c shows, however, no correlation between the rank of a web site (based on Tranco) and the number of ad exchanges it contacts: Popular web sites do not contact fewer exchanges than unpopular ones to improve user experience.

We also repeated these analyses with the Majestic Million top listFootnote 6 instead of Tranco. Majestic Million ranks web sites by the number of subnets linking to them, which is more of a quality measure than raw traffic. Regardless, we did not observe any significant change in the results and inferences presented above.

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Aqeel, W. et al. (2020). Untangling Header Bidding Lore. In: Sperotto, A., Dainotti, A., Stiller, B. (eds) Passive and Active Measurement. PAM 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12048. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44081-7_17

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