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Less Than Criminals: Crimmigration “Law” and the Creation of the Dual State

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Causes and Consequences of Migrant Criminalization

Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 81))

Abstract

This chapter lays out a broader framework for understanding the process of crimmigration—the merging of immigration and criminal law. It discusses alternative concepts and approaches to understanding what crimmigration law is or “serves for” and how it functions, such as Täterstrafrecht, Feindstrafrecht, inversion of law, counter-law, double state. Drawing on Hannah Arendt’s analysis of the functioning of law concerning refugees, and on Ernst Fraenkel’s theorem of the “double state” the chapter shows how crimmigration “law”—with its increasing “regulation” and “over-legislation” of migration—creates two parallel legal regimes for two different kinds of populations. All this leads, the article proposes, to a more general transformation of the state, the practice of law, and equality principle. They radically change their characters, not solely in the context of migration.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Arendt (1994a, p. 5).

  2. 2.

    Arendt (1986, pp. 8 and 295).

  3. 3.

    Ibid., pp. 295–296.

  4. 4.

    Ibid., pp. 281 and 296. I have dealt with this issue elsewhere (Jalušič 2017) while trying to show how today’s “migration management” has to maintain the picture of a passive and “innocent” refugee in order to pursue depoliticized solutions.

  5. 5.

    See Malkki (1995, p. 4).

  6. 6.

    Researchers are describing an enormous increase of both criminal and immigration legislation, a development also connected with anti-drug and anti-terrorist legislative. Cf. Hussain (2007), Roach (2011), García Hernández (2015) and Arnold (2018). The term “hyper-legality” was used to describe the strategy of increasing ad hoc production of administrative and other rules that were used to justify the securitization and over-policing of migration, and above all, expulsion and detention. See Hussain (2007, p. 740ff); and Arnold (2018).

  7. 7.

    See García Hernández in this volume.

  8. 8.

    Chimni (2000, p. 10), Aas and Gundhus (2015).

  9. 9.

    See Stumpf (2006).

  10. 10.

    See Stumpf (2006) and Provera (2015).

  11. 11.

    Stumpf (2006).

  12. 12.

    Provera (2015, p. i).

  13. 13.

    Parkin (2013) and Guild (2010).

  14. 14.

    Côté-Boucher (2015, p. 82).

  15. 15.

    Ibid.

  16. 16.

    Provera (2015).

  17. 17.

    Parkin (2013, p. 6).

  18. 18.

    Vazquez (2016, p. 1097).

  19. 19.

    Parkin (2013). The United States, up until now the leading country in detention of immigrants, incarcerates up to 34,000 immigrants per day. Diaz and Keen (2015). The EU Member States also started to use broadly the detention for the enforcement of the new immigration rules. Parkin (2013, p. 12ff).

  20. 20.

    Webber (1996, 2008).

  21. 21.

    Provera (2015, p. 3), maintains that compared to the US, “criminalization in a European context embraces a much broader understanding which has included ‘repressive action of police forces, and then of judicial proceedings’ because a person has ‘contravened to [sic] one or more norms of the administrative, civil or criminal code’, as well as discourse, the use of immigration detention and, importantly, is inclusive of the criminalization of those persons acting in solidarity with irregular migrants”.

  22. 22.

    Guild (2010, p. 39). I analysed the criminalisation of “pro immigrant activities” elsewhere. See Jalušič (2019).

  23. 23.

    See Guild (2010) and European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2014).

  24. 24.

    Provera (2015, p. 29).

  25. 25.

    Duff (2010a, b), Spena (2014), Zedner (2013), Provera (2015), García Hernández (2015); and his chapter in this volume.

  26. 26.

    Guild (2010), Parkin (2013), Fekete (2017, 2018), Carrera, Guild, Aliverti et al. (2016), European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2014).

  27. 27.

    See Hussain (2007, p. 749).

  28. 28.

    Voss and Bloemraad (2011), Provera (2015), Cantat (2015).

  29. 29.

    Fekete (2009), Provera (2015), Fekete (2017), Carrera et al. (2018a, b).

  30. 30.

    Vasquez (2016).

  31. 31.

    Parkin (2013, p. 6).

  32. 32.

    Bigo (2004, p. 85).

  33. 33.

    As already mentioned, there is no relationship between an increase in crime rates and migration, so the use of administrative detention to help identify, control and return undesirable migrants faster is not efficient, since the time of detention is prolonged for good (Broeders 2010). Strict border control and punitive attitudes, which are intended to discourage undesired migrants to risk the journey, only diverts their routes (Sampson 2015), and the crimmigration measures that should generate “security” of the “autochtonous” populations in general do not give such results (Carling and Hernández-Carretero 2011). Instead, they enable profit to newly-established corporations and prison systems, which are dealing with surveillance and surveillance techniques (Flynn 2016).

  34. 34.

    Sklansky (2012).

  35. 35.

    See also Provera (2015).

  36. 36.

    Zedner (2013, p. 11).

  37. 37.

    Ibid.

  38. 38.

    Spena (2014).

  39. 39.

    Ibid.

  40. 40.

    Arendt (1986, p. 433).

  41. 41.

    Ibid., p. 87.

  42. 42.

    See García Hernández in this volume.

  43. 43.

    Arendt (1986, p. 295).

  44. 44.

    Ibid., p. 297.

  45. 45.

    Arnold (2016, p. 12), and (2018) proceeds from paraphrasing Arendt’s (and also subsequent Agamben’s) thesis that it is better to be a criminal than the stateless person and discusses this while also observing that not absence of law is the characteristic of the status of migrant but “fullness” of rules—hyperlegality. She however argues that that Arendt, as well as Agamben, is “idealizing the criminal justice system and prison conditions” and that they do not take into account the “diminished personhood rights that inevitably occur to citizen-criminals before and after sentencing (or, before and during imprisonment)”.

  46. 46.

    Duff (2010a, b).

  47. 47.

    Bosworth (2012) and Zedner (2013, p. 54).

  48. 48.

    See Billings in this volume.

  49. 49.

    Stumpf (2006).

  50. 50.

    “A decision to exclude in criminal law results in segregation within our society through incarceration, while exclusion in immigration law results in separation from our society through expulsion from the national territory.” Stumpf (2006, p. 168). “Yet at bottom, both criminal and immigration law embody choices about who should be members of society: individuals whose characteristics or actions make them worthy of inclusion in the national community”. Ibid., p. 297.

  51. 51.

    Maybe the analogy between two exclusions holds more for some countries than for others. In the US, the exclusion of a criminal offender from civic rights is much more radical than in other places, such as Europe. Felons lose the right to vote and other political rights in all but two states (see Felon voting rights 2017), which is rarely the case in Europe. In 22 of the Council of Europe member states, prisoners retain their right to vote, while the rest have varying restrictions. In accordance with several sentences of the European Court of Human Rights, some of these restrictions are about to be removed (except for the UK after Brexit). See Horne and White (2015).

  52. 52.

    Agamben (1998, p. 126ff) concludes based on the theory of the state of exception that the refugee/stateless is paradoxically both excluded (as a citizen, resident) and included into law, at the same time (as a bare human being, homo sacer). Yet such law of inclusion can be considered “law” only if it is defined as “force” or violence, and law and violence in fact coincide.  Such total separation from justice (Recht) would be in my opinion the characteristic of totalitarian “law”.

  53. 53.

    Arendt (1994b, p. 150). See also Levi (2003, pp. 83–92).

  54. 54.

    Zedner (2013).

  55. 55.

    Duff (2010a, b, p. 148).

  56. 56.

    Hegel (1972, p. 96), § 100.

  57. 57.

    And as Garcia Hernandez (2015: 4) describes for the US case, in spite of the “immigration law’s early reliance on criminal law to decide upon whom to allow to enter into or remain in the United States, the Supreme Court made clear that deportation was not to be considered a form of punishment”.

  58. 58.

    Ibid., § 99.

  59. 59.

    Ericson (2007a, p. 207ff).

  60. 60.

    Fekete (2009).

  61. 61.

    Ericson (2007a, p. 219).

  62. 62.

    Ibid.

  63. 63.

    Fraenkel (2010).

  64. 64.

    Ibid., p. 3.

  65. 65.

    Schmitt’s position—Giorgio Agamben (1998: 15ff) took it over when he launched the thesis about homo sacer (which, with a sovereign decision, was excluded from law)—is dominating in recent reflections on the theory of sovereignty. They are located within Schmitt’s theory of decisionism, which greatly hampers the understanding of how the state of emergency is established. That does not necessarily happen on the edge, as an exceptional, “special case”, but can take place “within the usual legal procedures” carried out by individual officials, authorities, etc. In short, in order to understand these processes, one needs, as Austin Sarat argues, to move “beyond the drama of a sovereign suspension of legality” into a less abstract debate on sovereignty, emergency state and legality. Cf. Sarat (2010, p. 2).

  66. 66.

    Fraenkel (2010, p. 5).

  67. 67.

    Dreier (2012).

  68. 68.

    Fraenkel (2010, p. 89).

  69. 69.

    Ibid.

  70. 70.

    Ibid., p. 95 (emphasised by VJ). In this case, the court decided that the fact that the motion-picture stage manager was a Jew was equivalent to “sickness, death and similar causes rendering the stage manager’s work impossible” and that the company could therefore terminate the contract with an employee of Jewish origin. The court then also dismissed the complaint of the stage manager with the argument that “the former (liberal) theory of the legal status of the person made no distinction between races”. Ibid.

  71. 71.

    Bibler Coutin et al. (2014, p. 99).

  72. 72.

    Cf. Saito (2007).

  73. 73.

    Ericson (2007b, p. 7).

  74. 74.

    Walsh (2014, pp. 252–253).

  75. 75.

    Ibid.

  76. 76.

    Arendt (2007).

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Acknowledgements

This chapter is the result of two research projects – J5-7121 “Crimmigration between human rights and surveillance” and J5-1749 “The break in tradition: Hannah Arendt and conceptual change”, and the research programme P5-0413 “Equality and human rights in times of global governance”, all funded by the Slovenian Research Agency.

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Correspondence to Vlasta Jalušič .

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Jalušič, V. (2020). Less Than Criminals: Crimmigration “Law” and the Creation of the Dual State . In: Kogovšek Šalamon, N. (eds) Causes and Consequences of Migrant Criminalization. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 81. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43732-9_4

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