Abstract
This chapter examines how a better understanding of how our current scientific views regarding psychiatric diagnosis and treatment have evolved may help us understand why many of the criticisms leveled against psychiatry make little sense or apply only in a qualified way. It was written from the point of view of a practicing clinician. I do not present new findings from the history of psychiatry here; instead, I endeavor to argue the potential usefulness of those for the clinician. I also look at how approaching the history of psychiatry from the perspective of values-based medicine (VBM) could enhance our historical analysis, especially for the purposes of developing a theoretical approach and clinical practice of psychiatry that is more suited to our needs and preferences.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Only future scholarship in history of psychiatry can describe the exact impact on this of the current academic and funding structure and the way research ethics works.
- 2.
A lesson from history epitomising the inappropriateness of excluding the subjective or introspective in order to be ‘scientific’ in psychiatry is behaviourism which, although reaching a high degree of sophistication at its peak, failed to provide a plausible explanation of mental illness or to produce treatments for more than a few forms of it (e.g. systematic desensitisation for some phobias).
References
Berrios, G. E. (1996). The history of mental symptoms: Descriptive psychopathology since the nineteenth century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Berrios, G. E., & Porter, R. (Eds.). (1995). A history of clinical psychiatry: The origin and history of psychiatric disorders. London: Athlone.
Braslow, W. J. (1997). The history of mental symptoms. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 33, 274–276.
Dudas, R. B., Berrios, G. E., & Hodges, J. R. (2005). The Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination (ACE) in the differential diagnosis of early dementias versus affective disorder. The American Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry, 13, 218–226.
Fulford, K. W. M. (2007). Facts/values: Ten principles of values-based medicine. In J. Radden (Ed.), The philosophy of psychiatry: A companion (pp. 205–234). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fulford, K. W. M. (2011). Neuroscience and values: A case study illustrating developments in policy, training and research in the UK and internationally. Mens Sana Monographs, 9, 79–92.
Fulford, K. W. M. (2014). Values-based practice: The facts. In M. Loughlin (Ed.), Debates in values-based practice: Arguments for and against (pp. 150–170). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gine y Partagas, D. (1876). Tratado Teorico-practico de Frenopatologia. Madrid: Moya y Plaza.
Howells, J. G. (Ed.). (1975). World history of psychiatry. London: Baillière Tindall.
Mioshi, E., Dawson, K., Mitchell, J., Arnold, R., & Hodges, J. R. (2006). The Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination Revised (ACE-R): A brief cognitive test battery for dementia screening. International Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry, 21, 1078–1085.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2020 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Dudas, R. (2020). The Discontents of Psychiatry: What Can the History of Psychiatry and Values-Based Medicine Contribute to Resolving Them?. In: Marková, I.S., Chen, E. (eds) Rethinking Psychopathology. Theory and History in the Human and Social Sciences. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43439-7_14
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43439-7_14
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-43438-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-43439-7
eBook Packages: Behavioral Science and PsychologyBehavioral Science and Psychology (R0)