Abstract
After the debate between liberalism and communitarianism in the 1980s and 1990s, liberalism’s family quarrel takes center stage in recent literature on political theory. Representing two historically significant traditions, political liberalism and liberal perfectionism have become the most antagonistic pair in the liberal family. On the one hand, political liberalism refuses to ground liberalism on any particular conception of the good because people are deeply divided over ideals of human flourishing. On the other hand, liberal perfectionism regards liberalism and particular views of human flourishing as compatible. Both camps are inspired by concrete historical experiences and represent enduring intellectual traditions. Political liberalism, particularly the branch advocated by John Rawls, rests on Rawls’ observation of “reasonable pluralism,” which is inspired by the evolution of the social and historical conditions of modern democratic regimes that have their origins in “the Wars of Religion following the Reformation and the subsequent development of the principle of toleration, and in the growth of constitutional government and of large industrial market economies.” So the most sensible thing to do for political philosophy is to apply “the principle of toleration” to itself in order to arrive at a public conception of justice that is independent of controversial philosophical and religious doctrines. Liberal perfectionism is supported by the history of Western political thought from Plato and Aristotle to T. H. Green and Joseph Raz, where perfectionism seems to be the standard view of the state. A state that promotes worthwhile conceptions of the good are considered by many to be more desirable than one that fails to do so. Liberal perfectionism thus maintains the compatibility between basic liberal ideals and principles, and the view that the state should direct citizens to live good or meaningful lives, and discourage them from pursuing bad or worthless ones. Both political liberalism and liberal perfectionism have developed substantial arguments to support their positions, and the debate between them has helped to shape the intellectual landscape of contemporary political philosophy.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
For an anthology of works from both camps, see Perfectionism and Neutrality: Essays in Liberal Theory, eds. Steven Wall and George Klosko (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003).
- 2.
John Rawls, “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus,” Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 424.
- 3.
John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 14, No. 3 (Summer, 1985): 231.
- 4.
Joseph Chan, “Legitimacy, Unanimity, and Perfectionism,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 29, No.1 (Winter, 2000): 5.
- 5.
Ibid.: 6.
- 6.
For a comprehensive introduction to Confucianism and its influence in East Asia, see Xinzhong Yao, An Introduction to Confucianism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
- 7.
I borrow these characterizations from Jonathan Quong, Liberalism Without Perfection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 14–15.
- 8.
With the exception of Chapter 10, where the relationship between liberal and nonliberal states will be discussed as part of a theory of global justice.
- 9.
Jonathan Quong, Liberalism Without Perfection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 8.
- 10.
Ibid., 15.
- 11.
John Rawls’ theory represents the most well-known version of political liberalism. In addition to the Rawlsian political liberalism, Charles Larmore holds a similar theory that grounds liberalism on a moral basis. Gerald Gaus’ justificatory liberalism qualifies as a political liberal theory that also differs from Rawls’ theory in significant ways, especially in the case of public justification. See Charles Larmore, “The Moral Basis of Political Liberalism,” The Journal of Philosophy 96, No. 12 (1999): 599–625; Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). Gerald Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Gerald Gaus, The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
- 12.
Judith Shklar, “The Liberalism of Fear,” Liberalism and the Moral Life, Ed. Nancy Rosenblum (Harvard University Press, 1989).
- 13.
Many political philosophers have endorsed this position. See Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). Steven Wall, Liberalism, Perfectionism, and Restraint (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). George Sher, Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). William Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Joseph Chan, “Legitimacy, Unanimity, and Perfectionism,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 29, No.1 (Winter, 2000): 5–42.
- 14.
See Joseph Chan, “Legitimacy, Unanimity, and Perfectionism,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 29, No.1 (Winter, 2000): 5–42. See also Franz Fan-lun Mang, “Liberal Neutrality and Moderate Perfectionism,” Res Publica 19 (2013): 297–315.
- 15.
Jiang Qing is one of the most controversial advocates of comprehensive Confucianism. See A Confucian Constitutional Order: How China’s Ancient Past Can Shape Its Political Future, eds. Daniel Bell and Ruiping Fan, trans. Edmund Ryden (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2013), Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 8. Daniel Bell also advocates Confucian meritocracy, although his specific positions have shifted throughout the years. See Daniel Bell, Beyond Liberal Democracy: Political Thinking for an East Asian Context (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Daniel Bell, The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016).
- 16.
See Joseph Chan, Confucian Perfectionism: A Political Philosophy for Modern Times (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).
- 17.
See Sungmoon Kim, Public Reason Confucianism: Democratic-Perfectionism and Constitutionalism in East Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2020 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Li, Z. (2020). Introduction. In: Political Liberalism, Confucianism, and the Future of Democracy in East Asia. Philosophy and Politics - Critical Explorations, vol 12. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43116-7_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43116-7_1
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-43115-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-43116-7
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)