Abstract
If “rationalism” refers to the thesis that there is a right way to do whatever it is that we do—a way that we, with our reason, can discover—then Ludwig Wittgenstein is a critic of rationalism. For our words and deeds are justified only by the rules of particular language-games—but these language-games are themselves justified only insofar as they meet our needs; certainly none of them need be justified by reference to any of the others. Together, our language-games constitute our form of life; though this form of life is not entirely arbitrary—some of its features can be explained by reference to our nature—nonetheless, it could be different in many ways. Indeed, it has been—and therefore probably will be—different in many ways; on some level, we all know this. Philosophy at its worst is the attempt to forget it; philosophy at its best is, therefore, the attempt to remember it.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
See my “Rationalism in Eric Voegelin,” in Tradition v. Rationalism: Voegelin, Oakeshott, Hayek, and Others, ed. Lee Trepanier and Eugene Callahan (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2018), 51–61.
- 2.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 4th edition, ed. and trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009), § 23.
- 3.
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 11.
- 4.
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 18.
- 5.
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 23.
- 6.
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 23.
- 7.
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 415.
- 8.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, revised edition, ed. G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees, and G. E. M. Anscombe (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983), § 7.16.
- 9.
Mark Steiner points out that Wittgenstein—in his Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, a work philosophically continuous with his Investigations—is wrong to attack Gödel’s Theorem. For Gödel proved only that, within mathematics, a certain proposition is such that neither it nor its denial can be proven, but Wittgenstein apparently misinterpreted Gödel’s proof as somehow depending upon Gödel’s controversial interpretation of it—that, within mathematics, a certain proposition is true and nonetheless not provable; Wittgenstein insisted only that “truth” had no meaning in such a context—because it had no use. Ironically, Steiner notes, Gödel’s Theorem—stripped of Gödel’s own interpretation of it—is profoundly congenial to the doctrine of Wittgenstein: Wittgenstein insists that mathematics need not be derived from any foundation, while Gödel proved that mathematics cannot be derived from any foundation. See Mark Steiner, “Wittgenstein as His Own Worst Enemy: The Case of Gödel’s Theorem,” Philosophia Mathematica 9, no. 3 (2001): 257–279.
- 10.
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 201.
- 11.
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 201.
- 12.
Obviously, my presentation of this paradox owes much to that of Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982). It is less obvious to what extent my solution to the paradox is similar to his: Kripke is usually taken to offer a solution to the paradox—what is often called the “skeptical solution”—that is fairly unsubtle, but it seems to me that he might be interpreted more charitably than he usually is.
- 13.
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 201.
- 14.
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 202.
- 15.
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 202.
- 16.
See Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, ed. Onora O’Neill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 136–138.
- 17.
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 241.
- 18.
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 242.
- 19.
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 217.
Bibliography
Korsgaard, Christine. 1996. The Sources of Normativity, ed. Onora O’Neill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kripke, Saul A. 1982. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Sportiello, Daniel John. 2018. Rationalism in Eric Voegelin. In Tradition v. Rationalism: Voegelin, Oakeshott, Hayek, and Others, ed. Trepanier Lee and Eugene Callahan, 51–61. Lanham: Lexington Books.
Steiner, Mark. 2001. Wittgenstein as His Own Worst Enemy: The Case of Gödel’s Theorem. Philosophia Mathematica 9 (3): 257–279.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1983. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, ed. G.H. von Wright, R. Rhees, and G.E.M. Anscombe, revised ed. Cambridge: MIT Press.
———. 2009. Philosophical Investigations. Ed. and trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte, 4th ed. Oxford: Blackwell.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2020 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Sportiello, D.J. (2020). Wittgenstein on Rationalism. In: Callahan, G., McIntyre, K.B. (eds) Critics of Enlightenment Rationalism. Palgrave Studies in Classical Liberalism. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42599-9_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42599-9_7
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-42598-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-42599-9
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)