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A Brief History of the U.K.—E.U. Relationship

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Abstract

The History of British and European relations is long and storied, filled with conflicts, bickering, rejections, but also cooperation. It is thus inaccurate to characterize the relationship as solely rejecting; indeed, it has always oscillated between one of integration and distancing. Moreover, the historical baggage of hundreds of years prior to the 20th century cannot be discounted when considering the current relationships between Britain and Continental Europe.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For a superb historical analysis, especially since the 1990s, see Nicholas Wright. The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy in Germany and the UK: Co-Operation, Co-Optation and Competition (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).

  2. 2.

    For an excellent and short discussion of this see Anand Menon and John-Paul Salter. “Brexit: initial reflections”. International Affairs 92: 6 (2016) pp. 1297–1318.

  3. 3.

    Greenwood, S. (1992). Britain and European Cooperation since 1945. Oxford: Blackwell, p. 2.

  4. 4.

    See Council on Foreign Relations. (2017). Churchill's “United States of Europe” Speech, in Zurich. Retrieved from http://www.cfr.org/europe/churchills-united-states-europe-speech-zurich/p32536.

  5. 5.

    Diebold, William. (1959). The Schuman Plan: a study in economic cooperation 19501959, New York: Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Praeger; European Union (2017). The Schuman Declaration9 May 1950. Retrieved from https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration_en.

  6. 6.

    See Council on Foreign Relations (2017).

  7. 7.

    Greenwood (1992), p. 18.

  8. 8.

    Greenwood (1992), p. 26.

  9. 9.

    European Parliament (2017). The First Treaties. Retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_1.1.1.pdf, p. 1.

  10. 10.

    Julie Smith, “Europa und das Vereinigte Königreich-Kleine Geschichte der Beziehungen seit 1945”, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 49–50/2016, p. 11–16; Greenwood (1992), p. 35.

  11. 11.

    Greenwood (1992), p. 38.

  12. 12.

    Lindley-French, J. (2007). A Chronology of European Security & Defence: 1945–2007. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 26.

  13. 13.

    Ibid., p. 27.

  14. 14.

    Lindley-French (2007), p. 33.

  15. 15.

    Dinan, D. (2014). Europe Recast: A History of the European Union. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 6.

  16. 16.

    Greenwood (1992), p. 50.

  17. 17.

    Dinan (2014), p. 76.

  18. 18.

    Lindley-French (2007), p. 56.

  19. 19.

    See Greenwood (1992), p. 54; Lindley-French (2007), p. 55; Dinan (2014), p. 70.

  20. 20.

    Dinan (2014), p. 88.

  21. 21.

    Dinan (2014), p. 88; Lindley-French (2007), p. 19.

  22. 22.

    https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/125401/1168_DeGaulleVeto.pdf.

  23. 23.

    See e.g. O’Neill (2000), p. 355.

  24. 24.

    Dinan (2014), p. 135.

  25. 25.

    Lindley-French (2007), p. 112.

  26. 26.

    Hannay, D. (2000). Britain’s Entry into the European Community. Portland: Whitehall History Publishing.

  27. 27.

    Almost ten years later, Greece joined the EC in 1981; Spain and Portugal joined in 1986. When Germany reunited in 1990 former East Germany was automatically absorbed into the Community when it annexed with Western Germany.

  28. 28.

    Gliddon, P.M. (2017). The Labour government and the battle for public opinion in.

  29. 29.

    Lindley-French (2007), pp. 113−120.

  30. 30.

    Lindley-French (2007), p. 120; Bickerton, C. (2011). Towards a Social Theory of E.U. Foreign and Security Policy. Journal of Common Market Studies, 49(1), p. 176.

  31. 31.

    Peters, D. (2010). Constrained Balancing: The E.U.’s Security Policy. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 101.

  32. 32.

    Bickerton, 2011, p. 177.

  33. 33.

    Lindley-French (2007), p. 155; Dinan (2014), p. 208.

  34. 34.

    Dinan (2014), p. 209; Dinan et al. (2017).

  35. 35.

    The United Kingdom, France, German, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain (Lindley-French, 2007).

  36. 36.

    Dinan (2014), p. 209.

  37. 37.

    Cited in Dinan (2014), p. 208.

  38. 38.

    Parsons (2010), p. 717.

  39. 39.

    Parsons (2010), p. 718.

  40. 40.

    See Benjamin Zyla (2015). Sharing the Burden? NATO and its Second-Tier Powers (New York, Toronto: University of Toronto Press).

  41. 41.

    When speaking of the European Union reference is made to the political-institutional setting as opposed to a geographical union.

  42. 42.

    Christiansen, T., Duke, S. & Kirchner, E. (2013). Understanding and Assessing the Maastricht Treaty. In T. Christiansen & S. Duke, The Maastricht Treaty: Second Thoughts after 20 Years (1–14). New York: Routledge, p. 3; Cini, Michelle and Amy Verdun. “The implications of Brexit for the future of Europe”, in Martill, Benjamin and Uta Staiger (eds.) Brexit and Beyond: Rethinking the Futures of Europe. London: University College London Press, p. 63.

  43. 43.

    It is being recognized that the EU does not formally possess a seat at the United Nations as an international organization. Common diplomatic practice, however, is that most EU member states try to find a common position on a specific policy issue before it is being brought before the committees. See for example Heliskorski, J., The “Duty of Cooperation’ Between the European Community and Its Member States Within the World Trade Organization,” Finnish Yearbook if International Law 7 (1996), 59; Kuijper, P.J., “The European Communities and Arbitration,” in: A.H.A. Soons (ed.), International Arbitration: Past and Prospects, 1989, 181; Marchiso, S., “EU`s Membership in International Organizations,” in: E. Cannizzaro (ed.), The European Union as an Actor in International Relations, 2002, 231; Rosas, A., “The European Union and International Dispute Settlement,” in: Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Cesare P.R. Romano, Ruth Mackenzie (eds.), International Organizations and International Dispute Settlement: Trends and Prospects, 2002, 49; Sack, J., “The European Community`s Membership of International Organizations,” Common Market Law Review 32 (1995), 1227; Schermers, H.G., “International Organizations as Members of Other International Organizations,” in: R. Bernhardt et al. (eds.), Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung, internationale Gerichtsbarkeit, Menschenrechte: Festschrift für Hermann Mosler, 1983, p. 823.

  44. 44.

    Currently, the European Union receives its authority to deploy forces abroad from the Treaty of the European Union, Article 17.2, which says: “Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.” The terms peacemaking and humanitarian are taken from the WEU Petersberg Declaration of June 1992. See Petersberg Declaration, Western European Union, Western European Union Council of Ministers, Bonn, 19 June 1992.

  45. 45.

    However, the Europeans misleadingly use the term peacemaking instead of peace-enforcement, a term that the UN, NATO, and other countries commonly use. See for example Martin Ortega, Petersberg Tasks, and missions for the EU military forces (Paris: European Institute for Security Studies, 2005), available at http://www.iss.europa.eu/esdp/04-mo.pdf.

  46. 46.

    Madeleine Korbel Albright, “The Right Balance Will Secure Nato’s Future,” Financial Times 07.12.1998. For a greater discussion of the ‘3D’s’ see for example Sloan, NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged, p. 191.

  47. 47.

    Albright, “The Right Balance Will Secure Nato’s Future”.

  48. 48.

    George Robertson, “Die NATO Und Die EU: Partner Oder Rivalen?” in Europäische Sicherheits-Und Verteidigungspolitik. Der Weg Zu Integrierten Europäischen Streitkräften, ed. Werner Hoyer and Gerd F. L. Kaldrack (Badan-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2002).

  49. 49.

    Ibid., p. 189.

  50. 50.

    https://www.cvce.eu/obj/franco_british_st_malo_declaration_4_december_1998-en-f3cd16fb-fc37-4d52-936f-c8e9bc80f24f.html.

  51. 51.

    The first pillar creates an internal EU market, a joint agricultural policy, environmental policy, economic and monetary union, and a customs union. The third pillar includes cooperation in the field of home and justice affairs (e.g. Europol, Eurojust).

  52. 52.

    Title V, Article J.2 of the Treaty on the European Union, Maastricht 7 February 1992.

  53. 53.

    Peters (2010), p. 116.

  54. 54.

    Ibid.

  55. 55.

    Karl-Heinz Kamp (2017). “Eine nukleare Neuausrichtung der NATO”. SIRIUS, 1(4): 359–366, https://doi.org/10.1515/sirius-2017-0086.

  56. 56.

    Peters (2010), pp. 154–155.

  57. 57.

    Rees, G.W. (1996). Constructing a European Defence Identity: The Perspective of Britain, France and Germany. European Foreign Affairs Review, 1(2). 238.

  58. 58.

    Howorth, J. (2013). European Security Institutions 1945–2010: The Weaknesses and Strengths of ‘Brusselisization’. In S. Biscop and R.G. Whitman, The Routledge Handbook of European Security (5–17). New York: Routledge.

  59. 59.

    Peters (2010), p. 164. For example, in the “Lancaster House” agreement of 2010 between the U.K. and France of 2010, both states pledged to cooperate closely on nuclear as well as defence industry issues. Both praise the importance of this co-operation, their leadership role on managing global security and defense issues, point to their role as permanent UN Security Council members and nuclear powers, their high national defense expenditures, and experienced armies. In January 2018, both France and the U.K. have further deepened their cooperation, especially in maritime affairs and the fight against terrorism and political and social instability, especially in the Sahel region. Great Britain also committed to participating in France’s new prestige project, the European Intervention Initiative (EII), and to create a flexible intervention force outside of existing EU structures (to which politically willing and militarily capable EU member states such as Denmark, Estonia and Italy have agreed to). Germany, on the other hand, considers the EII project critically, primarily because it bypasses the EU structures. From a French point of view, however, it is a pragmatic approach to ensure Europe's operational capability and to permanently anchor the U.K. in Europe’s security cooperation.

  60. 60.

    Ware, R. & Wright, J. (2004). Second Pillar Challenges: Foreign Security and Defence Policies. In P. Giddings & G. Drewry, Britain in the European Union: Law, Policy and Parliament (175–198). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 177.

  61. 61.

    Griller, S., Droutas, D.P., Falkner, G., Forgo, K. & Nentwich, M. (2000). The Treaty of Amsterdam: Facts, Analysis, Prospect. New York: Springer, 2000, p. 422.

  62. 62.

    Griller et al. (2000), p. 410.

  63. 63.

    Ware & Wright (2004), p. 178.

  64. 64.

    These tasks were set out in the Petersberg Declaration adopted at the Ministerial Council of the WEU in June 1992 were member countries declared their readiness to make available to the WEU, as well as NATO and the EU, military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for the purpose of humanitarian and rescue tasks; conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks; combat forces for peacekeeping and peacemaking operations; and post-conflict stabilisation tasks.

  65. 65.

    Rynning, S. (2006). European Security and Defence Policy: Coming of Age? In F. Laursen, The Treaty of Nice: Actor Preferences, Bargaining and Institutional Choice (479–502). Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 480.

  66. 66.

    Rynning (2006), p. 481.

  67. 67.

    Rynning (2006), p. 481.

  68. 68.

    Ware & Wright (2004), p. 184.

  69. 69.

    Craig, P. (2010). The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform. New York: Oxford University Press.

  70. 70.

    Howorth (2013), p. 7.

  71. 71.

    Teixeira, N. S. (2012). European Defence: Challenges After the Treaty of Lisbon. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Policy Paper. (Report), pp. 3–4.

  72. 72.

    Biscop, S. & Coelmont, J. (2013). Military CSDP: The Quest for Capability. In S. Biscop and R.G. Whitman, The Routledge Handbook of European Security (78–90). New York: Routledge, p. 81; Craig, 2010, p. 424.

  73. 73.

    Gourlay, C. (2013). Civilian CSDP: A Tool for State-Building? In S. Biscop and R.G. Whitman, The Routledge Handbook of European Security (91–104). New York: Routledge, p. 92.

  74. 74.

    European Union External Action (2017). Security and Defence. Retrieved from https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/area/security-and-defence_en.

  75. 75.

    Merlingen, M. (2013) The CSDP in the Western Balkans: From Experimental Pilot to Security Governance. In S. Biscop and R.G. Whitman, The Routledge Handbook of European Security (145–158). New York: Routledge. p. 146.

  76. 76.

    Dinan (2014), p. 299.

  77. 77.

    Lindley-French (2007).

  78. 78.

    Samarakoon, L. (2017). Contagion of the Eurozone Debt Crisis. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money.

  79. 79.

    Gamble, A. (2012). Better Off Out? Britain and Europe. The Political Quarterly, 83(3). 468–477, p. 471. In recent discussions about the Brexit commentators often seemed to suggest that Britain has always been the ‘difficult’ child in the EU, as someone with special needs and always asking for exceptions (see e.g. Biscop, S. (2012), “The U.K. and European Defence: Leading or Leaving?” International Affairs 88(6): 1297–1313). While this characterization undoubtedly is partially true, we should also highlight some of influence that Britain has had throughout its EU membership. Among other things, Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate, member of the European parliament, helped to create the Passenger Name Records (PNR) Directive (see European Parliament. 2016. Parliament Backs EU Directive on Use of Passenger Name Records. European Parliament News, 14 April. Available from: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20160407IPR21775/parlia-ment-backs-eu-directive-on-use-of-passenger-name-records-pnr); the EU Policy Cycle4; the European Criminal Intelligence Model (see Gruszczak, A. 2017. The EU Criminal Intelligence Model: Problems and Issues. In EU Criminal Law and Policy: Values, Principles and Methods, ed. J. Banach-Gutierrez and C. Harding. London and New York: Routledge); while holding the presidency of the EU Council, the U.K. helped to create the Data Retention Directive (Ripoll Servent, A. 2015. Institutional and Policy Change in the European Parliament: Deciding on Freedom, Security and Justice. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan); and the EU counter-terrorism strategy (see MacKenzie, Alex, “The U.K., EU, and Counter-Terrorism”, in Carrapico, Helena and Antonia Niehuss, Chloé Berthélémy, Brexit and Internal Security Political and Legal Concerns on the Future U.K.EU Relationship. London: Palgrave Pivot, 2019, pp. 100–102). Moreover, the U.K. currently holds the world’s third largest forensic DNA database, after China and the USA (U.K. Government Statistics. 2018. National DNA Database Statistics. Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/national-dna-database-statistics; BBC. 2017a. Privacy Concerns as China Expands DNA Database, 17 May. Available from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-39945220; BI. 2018. CODIS-NDIS Statistics. Available from: https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/ndis-statistics).

  80. 80.

    Henry, C., & Jang, J.-H. (2012). Syria, The Arab Uprisings, and the Political Economy of Authoritarian Resilience. In The Arab Spring: Will It Lead to Democratic Transitions (pp. 212–226). New York: Palgrave MacMillan, p. 16.

  81. 81.

    Danahar, P. (2013). The New Middle East: The World After the Arab Spring. Great Britain: Bloomsbury Publishing.

  82. 82.

    See CBC News. (2014, April 3). Syria’s civil war: key facts, important players. Retrieved May 22, 2016, from http://www.cbc.ca/news2/interactives/syria-dashboard/index.html; Danahar, 2013; Henry & Jang, 2012: 214.

  83. 83.

    Amnesty International. (2015, April 7). Syria: The worst humanitarian crisis of our time. Retrieved May 23, 2016, from https://www.amnesty.org.nz/syria-worst-humanitarian-crisis-our-time; Ban, K. (2015, March). Secretary-General’s opening remarks at Humanitarian Pledging Conference for Syria. Statement presented at the Humanitarian Pledging Conference for Syria, Kuwait City. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=8505.

  84. 84.

    Hokayem, E. (2013). Syria’s Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant. London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 74.

  85. 85.

    Malantowicz, A. (2013). Civil War in Syria and the ‘New Wars’ Debate. Amsterdam Law Forum, 5(3), 57.

  86. 86.

    Adams, 2015, p. 6.

  87. 87.

    Barnard, A. (2016, February 11). Death Toll from War in Syria Now 470,000, Group finds. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/12/world/middleeast/death-toll-from-war-in-syria-now-470000-group-finds.html?_r=0; MercyCorps. (2016, February 5). Quick facts: What you need to know about the Syria crisis. Retrieved May 21, 2016, from https://www.mercycorps.org/articles/iraq-jordan-lebanon-syria-turkey/quick-facts-what-you-need-know-about-syria-crisis; World Vision. (2016, May 11). Syria refugee crisis FAQ: How the war is affecting children. Retrieved May 22, 2016, from https://www.worldvision.org/wv/news/Syria-war-refugee-crisis-FAQ.

  88. 88.

    Lifeline Syria.

  89. 89.

    Binley, B. & Rotherham, L. (2015). Hard Bargains or Weak Compromises? Reforming Britain’s Relationship With the E.U. London: Civitas, p. 24–25.

  90. 90.

    Giestel-Basten, S. (2016). Why Brexit? The Toxic Mix of Immigration and Austerity. Population and Development Review, 42(4). 673–680.

  91. 91.

    See for example Simon Duke. Will Brexit Damage our Security and Defence? The Impact on the UK and EU (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019); for a more historical analysis of the U.K. being an “awkward partner” see George, S. (1997). An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community (3rd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Important to note, for example is that the U.K. opted out of the Schengen Agreement, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the area of freedom, security and justice.

  92. 92.

    Tim Oliver. “Special relationships in flux: Brexit and the future of the US—EU and US—U.K. relationships”, in: International Affairs 3/2016, S. 547–567.

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Zyla, B. (2020). A Brief History of the U.K.—E.U. Relationship. In: The End of European Security Institutions?. SpringerBriefs in Political Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42160-1_3

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