Abstract
The outcome of the so-called Brexit, which is an abbreviation of “British exit” from the European Union (E.U.) that Britons had voted for in a nation-wide referendum on 23 June, 2016 surprised many, not only in the United Kingdom (U.K.). Other members of the E.U. were also astonished to learn that the U.K. decided to be the first country in the history of the E.U. to leave the mostly intergovernmental Union. This would mean that is the U.K.
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Notes
- 1.
When we use the term U.K. we refer to the entire British nation—that is Northern Ireland, England, Scotland, and Wales. Geographically speaking, Britain normally excludes Northern Ireland. For an excellent discussion of the Brexit and its deeper roots in British society see Geoffrey Evans and Anand Menon. 2017. Brexit and British Politics. Polity Press and Anand Menon and Brigid Fowler. 2016. “Hard or Soft? The Politics of Brexit”. National Institute Economic Review 238, pp. R4–R12.
- 2.
The obvious exceptional cases where the E.U.’s size was diminished are with the cases of Greenland and Algeria. See Kiran Klaus Patel, Kiran Klaus. “Something new under the sun? The lessons of Algeria and Greenland”, in Martill, Benjamin and Uta Staiger (eds.) Brexit and Beyond: Rethinking the Futures of Europe. London: University College London Press; Tim Oliver, “Goodbye Britannia? The International Implications of Britain’s Vote to leave the E.U.”, Geopolitics, History, and International Relations 8(2) 2016, p. 218.
- 3.
Niklas Helwig and Isabelle Tannous. “Gemeinsame Außen-und Sicherheitspolitik”, in Werner Weidefeld and Wolfgang Wessels, Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2016, p. 343. To be sure, the E.U. currently has The E.U. has 42 agencies, or which 6 can be considered executive and 36 regulative agencies. Each is designed to carry out specific legal, technical or scientific tasks that are central to the overall functioning of the E.U. For a discussion see European Union, “The E.U. agencies working for you”. 2006. https://doi.org/10.2814/522644; Keleman, D.R., “The Politics of ‘Eurocratic' Structure and the New European Agencies”, in West European Politics 25, no. 4. 2011. https://doi.org/10.1080/713601644.
- 4.
We hasten to add that in case the Brexit materializes the U.K. would also be placed outside the E.U. single market; the E.U.’s 32 specialized agencies (e.g. the European Medicines Agency, the European Banking Authority, the European Aviation Safety Agency) as well as the more than 40 trade agreements that the E.U. currently has signed with over 65 countries; other key E.U. programs and initiatives (e.g. in the area of research the successor to Horizon 2020 programme), the Galileo programme and its commercial and security aspects (e.g. satellite navigation), the Erasmus programme facilitating student and research mobility for circa 678000 individuals and with a budget of more than Euro 2.1 billion (European Commission, 2017) http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/erasmus-plus/about_en#tab-1-5; and Eurojust, and the European Arrest Warrant (EAW). Moreover, the U.K. will no longer be a formal participant in the E.U.’s sanctions process (e.g. against Russia).
- 5.
See HM Government. 2017. ‘Prime Minister’s Letter to Donald Tusk Triggering Article 50.’ 29 March (available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prime-ministers-letter-to-donald-tusk-triggering-article-50).
- 6.
We follow Tim Oliver here with this term to consider Brexit as a process rather than an event. It thus signals multidimensionality, complexity, and actorness. See Oliver, Tim. 2016. “The world after Brexit: From British referendum to global agenda.” International Politics 53 (6): 689–707.
- 7.
To be sure, the Brexit referendum simply decided that the U.K. would leave the E.U., not NATO.
- 8.
See e.g. MacGillivray, Iain (2016). Four effects of Brexit on the Middle East. Global Risk Insights, 14. July 2016. Available at http://globalriskinsights.com/2016/07/four-effects-brexit-middle-east; see also E.U. Global Strategy. (2016, June). Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy; Rob Johnson and Janne Haaland Matlary (eds.) The United Kingdom’s Defence After Brexit: Britain’s Alliances, Coalitions, and Partnerships (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), pp. 2–3.
- 9.
See e.g. Trump, Donald J. (2016) Foreign policy speech to the Centre for the National Interest in Washington, DC. Available at: https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/donald-j.-trump-foreign-policy-speech.
- 10.
Figures are expressed in Constant (2017) Prices and Exchange Rates (US$ Billion). Countries are ranked using Market Exchange Rates (MER) and figures are also shown calculated using Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) rates. If a different base year were used, the rankings could change due to fluctuations in exchange rates.
- 11.
However, it is also true given these numbers that Europeans spend more than twice as much on defence as Russia (namely just short of $150 billion).
- 12.
For a quick discussion see Dijkstra, H. (2016). “U.K. and E.U. foreign policy cooperation after Brexit.” RUSI Newsbrief, 36(5), 1–3. Retrieved from https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/dijkstra_newsbrief_sept_vol.36_no.5.pdf as well as Rob Johnson and Janne Haaland Matlary (eds.) The United Kingdom’s Defence After Brexit: Britain’s Alliances, Coalitions, and Partnerships (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019). On the JEF specifically see Tormod Heier, “Britain’s Joint Expeditionary Force: A Force of Friends?”, in Rob Johnson and Janne Haaland Matlary (eds.) The United Kingdom’s Defence After Brexit: Britain’s Alliances, Coalitions, and Partnerships (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019, pp. 189–214.
- 13.
The OECD, for example, has estimated in 2016 that the U.K.’s GDP would be more than 3% smaller by 2020 (in comparison to continued E.U. membership), and 5% lower by 2030 – the equivalent of £3200 per household (estimates are calculated on 2016 prices). It is also commonly expected that Brexit would have long term structural impacts on the U.K. economy in terms of reduced capital inflows, lower immigration, lower technical progress, stagnant labour productivity due to less foreign direct investments. For a scholarly discussion (with the exception of security) see da Costa Cabral, Nazaré, José Renato Gonçalves, Nuno Cunha Rodrigues (Eds.). After Brexit: Consequences for the European Union. London: Palgrave Macmillan. In 2016, for example, roughly 1.2 million British citizens lived in the E.U., while 3 million E.U. citizens lived in the U.K.; see McBridge, “What Brexit Means”; special issue of National Institute Economic Review vol. 238, no. 1, November 2016.
- 14.
Undoubtedly, the U.K. must increase their foreign and security (human) resources significantly. See Chalmers, Malcolm. “U.K. Foreign and Security Policy after Brexit”, Briefing Paper, January 2017; Alicia von Voss and Torben Schütz. “The U.K.’s potential role in enabling E.U.–NATO cooperation after Brexit“, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and German Council on Foreign Relations, June 2018.
- 15.
Some commentators suggest that the Brexit might actually require more resources that staying within the E.U. See Richard Whitman: Brexit or Bremain: what future for the U.K.'s European diplomatic strategy?, in: International Affairs 3/2016, S. 509–529.
- 16.
Some analysts have suggested that the Brexit would make it incredibly difficult for the U.K. to continue to cooperate with the E.U. in the areas of foreign-, security-, and defence policy. See Bond, i. (2015). Cameron’s security gamble: is Brexit a strategic risk? Centre for European reform. London, 21 December. http://www.cer.eu/insights/camerons-security-gamble-brexit-strategic-risk; and Kerr, John (2016). Brexit would shake the four pillars of British foreign policy. Centre for European Reform. London, 31 May; https://www.cer.eu/insights/brexit-would-shake-four-pillars-british-foreign-policy.
- 17.
See also Stephanie Hofmann, “Brexit will weigh heavily on European security. Here’s Why.” The Washington Post Monkey Cage Analysis, October 18, 2018.
- 18.
Tim Oliver, “Goodbye Britannia? The International Implications of Britain’s Vote to leave the E.U.”, Geopolitics, History, and International Relations 8(2) 2016, p. 225.
- 19.
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee: Implications of the referendum on E.U. membership for the U.K.’s role in the world, 26.4.2016, available at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmfaff/545/545.pdf (last access 01.7.2017).
- 20.
Out of the 29 NATO members in total, these 6 include Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the U.K., and the USA.
- 21.
Chalmers, Malcolm. “U.K. Foreign and Security Policy after Brexit”, Briefing Paper, January 2017, p. 2.
- 22.
The U.K. has a GDP of €2.569 billion, France €2.184 billion, and Germany €3,026 billion. See Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung. Dossier: Der Brexit und die britische Sonderrolle in der E.U.. 26.02.2019. p. 5.
- 23.
This is based on calculations by the U.K. Office for National Statistics. See detailed calculations here: https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/governmentpublicsectorandtaxes/publicsectorfinance/articles/theukcontributiontotheeubudget/2017-10-31. Specifically, in 2018 the U.K. government spent £864.9 billion on all aspects of public spending, of which initially £20.0 billion was transferred to the E.U. However, this amount is not the net-amount of transfers as it does not include U.K. rebates and abatements, which for 2018 amounts to £4.5 billion. From the remaining £15.5 billion, the U.K. received additional £4.5 billion from the E.U. from the so-called ‘shared management’ programmes (e.g. the agricultural guarantee fund etc.). This brings the net transfer amount of the U.K. to the E.U. to £11 billion (or roughly €12.85 billion).
- 24.
James McBridge, “What Brexit Means”, Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, March 29, 2017. See also Der Brexit und das E.U.—Machtgefüge—Wie wirkt sich das britische Votum auf die E.U. und ihr Gewicht in der Welt aus? Hrsg.: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V. Abrufbar unter: https://dgap.org/de/thinktank/publi-kationen/fuenffragen/derbrexitunddaseumachtgefuege.
- 25.
McBridge, “What Brexit Means”.
- 26.
Ward, M. (2019). “Statistics on U.K.—E.U. trade”, House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper No. 7851, 3.
- 27.
Ibid. This includes the so-called “Britain rebate” by which the U.K. is reimbursed about 66% of its net payments to the E.U.. See Weinmann, G. “Britenrabatt”, in Martin Große Hüttmann u. Hans-Georg Wehling (Hg.): Das Europalexikon, 2., aktual. Aufl. Bonn: Dietz 2013.
- 28.
Uta Staiger and Benjamin Martill. 2018. “Rethinking the futures of Europe”, in Benjamin Martill and Uta Staiger. Brexit and Beyond: Rethinking the Futures of Europe. London, U.K.: UCL Press, pp. 260–265.
- 29.
Richard Whitman. “Brexit or Bremain: what future for the U.K.'s European diplomatic strategy?”, International Affairs 3/2016, S. 509–529.
- 30.
See Niklas Helwig and Isabelle Tannous. “Gemeinsame Aussen-und Sicherheitspolitik”, in: Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration, 2016, p. 341.
- 31.
Jolyon Howorth (2017). “E.U. defence cooperation after Brexit: what role for the U.K. in the future E.U. defence arrangements?”, European View 16:191–200 https://doi.org/10.1007/s12290-017-0455-5.
- 32.
See for example Anand Menon. “Littler England: The United Kingdom’s Retreat From Global Leadership”. Foreign Affairs, November/December 2015, pp. 93–100.
- 33.
For example, the U.K. is a leader in reconnaissance in Europe: it owns 44% of the airborne early-warning and control aircraft, and nearly half of the E.U.’s heavy transport aircraft. Both are only to be replaced by the E.U. and its member states at significant costs.
- 34.
Faleg, G. (July 26, 2016). The Implications of Brexit For the E.U.’s Common Security and Defence Policy. CEPS. Retrieved March 5, 2017, from https://www.ceps.eu/publications/implications-brexit-eu%E2%80%99s-common-security-and-defence-policy#_ftnref3.
- 35.
Niklas Helwig and Isabelle Tannous. “Gemeinsame Außen-und Sicherheitspolitik”, in Werner Weidefeld and Wolfgang Wessels, Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2016, p. 343. To be sure, this “special relationship” has never been that of equals, and was one “of choice” for the Americans. See James K. Wither. “Brexit and the Anglo-American Security and Defense Partnership”, Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018, pp. 73–84.
- 36.
As Stephanie Hofmann shows, the E.U. and NATO are deeply intertwined. See Stephanie C. Hofmann (2019) The politics of overlapping organizations: hostage-taking, forum-shopping and brokering, Journal of European Public Policy, 26:6, 883-905, https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2018.1512644.
- 37.
Scotland roughly represents about five percent of Britain’s population, yet more than a third of the U.K.’s territory. It is especially the latter point that makes it vitally important as a strategic location for NATO’s northern defence.
- 38.
According to RUSI’s calculations, a relocation of British forces based in Scotland, including the logistics thereof back to Britain is extremely expensive, politically sensitive, and complicated. See Hugh Chalmers and Malcolm Chalmers, Relocation, Relocation, Relocation: Could the U.K.’s Nuclear Force be Moved after Scottish Independence? (London: RUSI, 2014).
- 39.
For a discussion see David Blagden. “Britain and the World After Brexit”. International Politics 54(1), 2017, pp. 1–25. Military bases in Scotland are also used as a part of the critical defence perimeter and the maritime defence zone, aside from a number of weapons manufacturers there. For a more detailed discussion see HM Government. 2014. Scotland analysis: Defence. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/285961/Scotland_infographics_26022014.pdf.
- 40.
“Joint Fact Sheet: U.S. and U.K. Defense Cooperation,” White House, March 14, 2012, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-ofce/2012/03/14/joint-fact-sheet-us-and-uk-defense-cooperation.
- 41.
Deutsche Welle. (2015, March 8). Juncker Calls for Collective E.U. Army. Deutsche Welle. Retrieved from http://www.dw.com/en/juncker-calls-for-collective-eu-army/a-18302459.
- 42.
For a discussion see for example Sven Biscop, Brexit, Strategy, and the E.U.: Britain Takes Leave. Egomont Paper 100. Brussels: Egmont Institute.
- 43.
For an extensive debate and elaboration see Zyla, Benjamin, and Arnold Kammel, A. Peacebuilding At Home: NATO in Eastern Europe (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2018).
- 44.
A wonderful overview can be found in Kienzle, B. (2016). The Foreign, Security and Defence Implications of Brexit: A Guide to the Academic Literature. Regional Security Research Centre.
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Zyla, B. (2020). Introduction. In: The End of European Security Institutions?. SpringerBriefs in Political Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42160-1_1
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