Abstract
The Resilience Assessment of the panarchy (European Union /Union for the Mediterranean/Middle East and North Africa member states), using the prescriptions of the Resilience Assessment Workbook, requires detailed information of the focal system and its history over the period of assessment (1972–2008). This chapter details the events in the region defining the focal systems (North Africa and the Middle East), and points to significant disturbances during this period. The consequences for the assessment are summarised as used in the assessment presented in Chap. 8.
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Notes
- 1.
According to the diplomatic consultative process outlined in the Barcelona Declaration and thereafter, a wide selection of stakeholders, including civil society and grass roots organisations (GROs) have already been consulted to obtain the main issues of concern in the social ecological system under study. Barcelona Declaration Adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference 27–28/11/95. [online] http://www.eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/bd_en.pdf [accessed 29 Oct. 2014] p. 9/17; European Commission Communication 2008/319 Final/EU of 20 May 2008 on the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean. [online] http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52008DC0319&from=EN. p. 2.
- 2.
In the original Barcelona Declaration, its initial goals were to turn the Mediterranean into an “area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation, guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity”. Barcelona Declaration, 1995. op.cit. p. 1/17.
- 3.
There is no indication of how the De-pollution of the Sea, the Mediterranean Solar Plan, the monitoring of maritime and land highways will directly effect the development of democracy, peace, or prosperity for example. Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean, Paris, 13 July 2008. [online] http://www.euromed-seminars.org.mt/archive/ufm/Joint_declaration_of_the_Paris_summit_for_the_Mediterranean-EN.pdf [accessed 29 Dec. 2014] p. 19–20/20.
- 4.
The two sub-regions are a mixture of oil and non-oil economies. Oil economies, however, give the region its position in the international economy and geostrategic relevance for the rest of the region. Oil economies: Libya, Algeria, Syria, and Egypt (mixed); Non-oil economies: Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritania, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestinian Authority, Israel. See Cammett, M., 2014. The Political Economy of Development in the Middle East. In Lust, E., (Ed.) 2014. The Middle East. California: SAGE. p. 174–5.
- 5.
“Social support is the national average of the binary responses, either 0 or 1, to the question “if you were in trouble, do you have relatives or friend you can count on to help you whenever you need them, or not?” See Helliwell, J., et al., 2013. The World Happiness Report 2013. New York: UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network. p. 20.
- 6.
“Generosity” is the “residual” of the regressing national average of response to the question “have you donated money to a charity in the past month?” on GDP per capita. Helliwell, J., et al., 2013. op.cit. p. 20.
- 7.
In the post-World War I period, “Every political entity in the region was new. Almost without exception governmental and legal structures, institutions, and practices had to be created from scratch. These structures were planned and designed with the aim of moulding a modern national consciousness as well”. Gasper, M., The Making of the Modern East. 2014. In Lust, E., (Ed.) 2014. op.cit. p. 39.
- 8.
“Turkification” was the idea behind the Young Turks’ (1908) socio-political restructuring using the modern European state-model, and imposed the use of Turkish language and a centralised government that would “unite the empire’s many ethnic and confessional elements around a Turkish identity”. Davis, E., 2014. “Iraq”. In Lust, E., (Ed.) 2014. Ibid. p. 513.
- 9.
The combination of an Arab Renaissance or Arab Nahda in the middle of the nineteenth century, the Islamic Modernist movement at the turn of the nineteenth beginning of the twentieth century, and enforced “Turkification” led to a nationalist backlash. See Gasper, M., 2014. Ibid. pp. 22 ff.
- 10.
Yevgeny Primakov admits that only Yemen came close to the form of scientific communism practised in the Soviet Union. Kerr (1971) proposes that Syria, out of fear of losing control to the Communist party, led the petition to join Egypt to form the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958. Primakov, Y., 2009. Russia and the Arabs: Behind the Scenes in the Middle East from the Cold War to the Present. New York: Basic Books. When Iraq fell to Abd al Qasim, [a] “…strange regime that drifted in a twilight zone between Communism and a shapeless anarchic radicalism resting on no visible organised support…” was inaugurated (Kerr 1971), and Nasser hence referred to Iraq as a “traitor to Arab nationalism and a stooge of international Communism”. Kerr, M. H., 1971. The Arab Cold War: Gamal ‘Abd Al-Nasir and His Rivals. Third edition. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 17.
- 11.
While the Pact consisted of these countries, the USA played a financial and orchestrating role. See Best, A., et al., 2008. International History of the Twentieth Century and Beyond. Second edition. Oxford: Routledge. p. 231.
- 12.
The Greek Civil war in 1944: Britain had been assisting the Royalists who had won the election, but was unable to continue due to its financial debt. At the same time Britain declared its withdrawal, the Greek Royalists requested help from the US, which duly supplied support. See Best, A., et al. 2008. op.cit. p. 226.
- 13.
This was contrary to US doctrine, which attached conditions – either economic or ideological – to receiving its aid/assistance. In contrast to the USSR, the US had much more resources to extend, but it was this difference which more often than not, swayed the balance in the Soviet’s favour. Best, A., et al., 2008. Ibid. p. 321.
- 14.
The Suez Crisis was fuelled by the failure of the USA to support a World Bank loan for building the Aswan dam. When the USA failed to back this venture, Nasser seized control of the Suez Canal. See Brand, L. A., Jordan. 2014. In Lust, E., (Ed.) 2014. Ibid. p. 581; Sorenson, D.S., 2008. An Introduction to the Middle East: History, Religion, Political Economy, Politics. Boulder: Westview Press. p. 26.
- 15.
Funding Islamist groups became “institutionalised” during the Afghan war and the occupation by Soviet forces: the USA actively funded the mujahidin through local mosques. Law, R.D., 2009. Terrorism : A History. Cambridge: Policy Press. p. 296.
- 16.
The Third World was originally meant to signify all those apart from the First World, the USA and its ideological allies, and the Second World (the USSR and communist states). See Best, A., et al., 2008. Ibid. p. 319.
- 17.
The cases of Algeria (1990–2002), Egypt, and the Palestinian Territories are cases in point. Francesco Cavatorta (2009) is particularly instructive in the internal/external dynamics, which lead to first the promotion of the liberal democratic ideal in Algeria, and the circumstances that led to its unravelling. See Cavatorta, F., 2009. The International Dimension of the Failed Algerian Transition: Democracy Betrayed? Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- 18.
Authoritarian governments were more inclined to favour a particular set of entrepreneurs in the reforms involved with liberalisation of the economy, for example. In turn, these favoured few reinforced the status quo in pursuit of their established interests. See Cammett, M., 2014. op.cit. p. 194; Cavatorta, F., 2014. “International Politics of the Middle East”. In Lust, E., (Ed.) 2014. Ibid. p. 413–414.
- 19.
This is supported by views obtained in personal interviews with political representatives from North Africa, during the course of research for this book.
- 20.
This, according to Law, is distinct from jihadism and considered a specific, religious-driven reactionism to modernisation and western influence. See Law, R. D., 2009. op.cit. Ch. 4.
- 21.
According to the 1949 Armistice lines. See Cleveland, W. L., and Bunton, M., 2013. A History of the Modern Middle East. Fifth edition. Boulder: Westview Press. p. 249.
- 22.
The PLO (an umbrella organisation established in 1964 by Arab states that brought together different groups of anti-Israeli protest and united by the idea of armed struggle and retaliation) included Fatah (the largest group), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) (the second largest group), and eventually the Black September Organisation. Law, R.D., 2009. Ibid. p. 220.
- 23.
Apart from publicity for the Palestinian cause, terrorism was directed against Western European involvement in international politics. See Bicchi, F., 2007. European Foreign Policy Making Toward the Mediterranean. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 69.
- 24.
Europe became “the most active terrorist environment in the world”, Pluchinsky, 1982 cited in Bicchi, F., 2007. op.cit. p. 69.
- 25.
A “war” to create an Islamic area, so that all Muslims may live under Sharia. See Law, R. D., 2009. Ibid. p. 282. While jihad in modern popular journalism has become almost exclusively associated with armed political struggle, jihad in Islamic thought has two interpretations. “Lesser” jihad is associated with armed struggle, while “greater” jihad has a specific spiritual relevance to daily life. See Ramadan, T., 2001. Islam, the West, and the Challenges of Modernity. [e-book Adobe DRM epub version] Leicester: The Islamic Foundation. p. 65.
- 26.
Salafism Lit. the return to the Quran and hadith (or sayings) for sharia. Loc.cit.
- 27.
The economies in the Middle East and North Africa can be divided between oil dependent and non-oil dependent economies, and further differentiated on their political structures: oil monarchies and non-oil monarchies, oil and non-oil single party republics, and democracies. See Cammett, M., 2014., Ibid. pp. 174–181.
- 28.
Import Substitution Industrialisation or ISI strategies were thought to assist in economic diversification, leading states previously subject to narrowly defined growth paths and volatile markets towards a more stable growth and predictable development pattern. The idea was to invest in local industrialisation to replace dependency on (expensive) imports, and at the same time produce for export. The faillings of ISI were considered to be over-subsidised industries and neglect of rural sectors; high production costs incapable of being competitive with international markets and therefore unable to earn foreign exchange; and over-valuation of currency rates. Balance of payments crises, public deficits and rising domestic inflation ensued. See Richards, A., and Waterbury, J., 1990. A Political Economy of the Middle East: State, Class and Economic Development. Boulder: Westview Press. pp. 25 and 27.
- 29.
Jordon was an exception to the ISI adoption rule. ISI was generally pursued by oil-poor countries although a mixture of the export led/ISI was most probable, as in the case of Egypt and Tunisia. Rich, oil producing monarchies such as pre-revolutionary Iran and Saudi Arabia, also fell into this category. Saudi Arabia’s circumstances were exceptional both in the amount of oil wealth it possessed and in the small population. It was therefore able to pursue both outward and inward-looking development strategies, combining mineral export-led growth strategies with industrialisation. In the Saudi case, this led to protectionist measures against them by the USA and western Europe when their exports became too competitive. See Richards, A., and Waterbury, J., 1990. op.cit. p. 2; and Cammett, M., 2014. Ibid. p. 190–1.
- 30.
Other “reasons” for the ensuing imbalance that contributed to the deepening of the economic crisis were “shrinking demand for migrant labour, reduced remittance flows and a more competitive international environment”. In addition, internal controls and restrictions hindered the development of investment and manufactured exports, which in turn created asymmetries with external would-be partners. See Yousef, M., 2004. Development, Growth and Policy Reform in the Middle East and North Africa since the 1950. Journal of Economic Perspectives, (18)3. p. 98.
- 31.
Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, Greece, Turkey, Spain, and Egypt all concluded Cooperation Agreements between 1962 and 1973. Pre-Global Mediterranean Policy, these agreements opened up European Economic Community (EEC) markets on a reciprocal basis (in theory), to varying levels of concessions and a range of issues forming a preferential “pyramid”, moving to most favoured at the apex, such as Greece, to least favoured, such as Turkey. While some Agreements contained space for providing financial aid and social provisions, all were centred on trade and creating conditions for the development of economies of scale to emerge. See Richards, A., and Waterbury, J., 1991. Ibid. p. 29–30; Bicchi, F., 2007. Ibid. p. 57.
- 32.
This came in 1989 with the Renovated Mediterranean Policy, but in most cases this was too late for North African and Middle Eastern states, which had already entered into a cycle of increasing authoritarian control and suppressive regimes in order to counter act resistance to structural adjustment and accompanying austerity measures. See Cavatorta, F., 2014. op.cit. p. 413–414; Bicchi, F., 2007. Ibid. p. 119.
- 33.
Development and economic growth are traditionally measured by GDP, and per capita income (World Bank) . These measures run counter to Islamic culture (of which finance and economic gain are “morally” referential), or at least the prevalent socio-economic structures in North African/Middle Eastern states, most of which are traditionally clan/tribal, pastoral nomads or settled/sedentary agriculturalists. Ramadan, T., 2001. Islam, the West, and the Challenges of Modernity. [e-book Adobe DRM version] Translated from Arabic by Said Amghar. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation. Kalahari.com. p. 116; Cammett, M., 2014. Ibid. p. 165; Richards, A., et al., 2008. A Political Economy of the Middle East. Third edition. Updated 2013 edition. Boulder: Westview Press. p. 9–10.
- 34.
Tunisia was the first country to begin to liberalise its economy in 1972, with others such as Morocco, Jordan, and Egypt with the assistance of the IMF in the mid-1980s and 1990s. Tunisia and Algeria had been assisted through Association Agreements with the EEC in 1963. Cammett, M., 2014. The Political Economy of Development in the Middle East. In Lust, E., (Ed.) 2014. Ibid. p. 197. Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco’s relations with the EC started as far back as 1969 with commercial-based Cooperation Agreements. See country profiles of Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation (MEDEA) [online] http://www.medea.be/en/medea/message-from-the-president/
- 35.
So called “rentier” state and “Dutch Disease” in many cases was prevalent in oil producing states, but not exclusive to them. The major drawbacks for countries that succumbed to so-called Dutch disease was the over reliance on a particular sector for economic growth and therefore lack of diversification and stability. Other long-term effects of over-use and dependency are the depletion of eco-system services. See Richards, A., et al., 2008. op.cit. p. 13; Cammett, M., 2014. Ibid. p. 902, Note 10.
- 36.
Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, the founder of Hezbollah in Lebanon called for the same kind of revolution to set up an Islamic state, and also inspired the take-over of the Grand Mosque in Saudi Arabia in November of 1979. See Law, R. D., 2009. Ibid. pp. 288 and 289.
- 37.
The “theocratic republic” was – and is – considered to be both Islamic and democratic. Governance, according to Shi’a Islam, the kind practised in Iran, is deemed to be divine; sovereignty “lies with God”. Democracy for the Iranians, was considered to be based on religion, equality, and justice. The ulema (trained interpreters of Holy-law) can only interpret god’s will, and according to this logic, are the rightful leaders of the political/legal/economic systems that is Islamic society. The kind of government structure in Iran that hence came about after the Revolution, was therefore a mixture of religious Islamic belief and “democratic traditions” inherited from Reza Pahlavi’s Iran, and created institutions which separated individual rights and electoral rights (the president, members of parliament, the Assembly of Experts, local city and village councils). Previous institutions were kept and new ones introduced that reinforced the new Iran. For example, the Revolutionary Guard was established in addition to the existing army. See Boroujerdi, M., 2014. Iran. In Lust, E., (Ed.) 2014. Ibid. p. 484–5; Lewis, B., 2003. The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror. [e-book Adobe DRM epub version] New York: Random House. Kalahari.com. p. 21–22.
- 38.
The USA became the “Great Satan”. See Held, C.C., and Cummings, J. T., 2011. Middle East Patterns: Places, People, and Politics. Fifth edition. Boulder: Westview Press. p. 597.
- 39.
Boroujerdi calls this “Islamic internationalism”. It was only much later that the realisation of its national priorities and the confines of the state within the international state system curbed its fervour for ideological export, and Iran became more “pragmatic” in its approach to international relations. See Boroujerdi, M., 2014. Ibid. p. 502.
- 40.
In states where communism or left-leaning opposition were evident, governments saw mileage in supporting Islamist movements, which expressed distrust of the western-inspired atheistic communism. Eventually however, Islamist groups turned against their sponsors (as in the case of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria). When the USSR invaded Afghanistan in the same year, the same governments were only too pleased to have an outlet to divert them to, organised by the USA-led counter insurgency against the Soviets. See Gasper, M., 2014. Ibid. p. 65; Moran, D., 2001. Wars of National Liberation. London: Cassell. p. 235.
- 41.
- 42.
- 43.
- 44.
Saudi Arabia, Japan, and Western Europe formed the “triangle”, to provide cheap oil and air force bases to the west. See Menoret, P., 2014. op.cit. p. 760.
- 45.
General Secretariat of the Council Press Office EU-Africa Summit Brussels 2014 Fourth EU-Africa Summit Declaration 2–3 April 2014, Brussels. [online] https://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/en/stay-informed/news/4th-africa-eu-summit; African Union – European Union Summit 2017 AU-EU/Decl.1(V) Investing in Youth for Accelerated Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development. Declaration 29–30 November, Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire. https://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/en/our-events/5th-au-eu-summit
- 46.
Made up of the United States, Britain, France, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. See Al-Awadi, H., 2014. Kuwait. In Lust, E., (Ed.) 2014. Ibid. p. 595.
- 47.
For example, the Arab Fund ceased to function due to the split in allegiances, as well as the OPEC itself. Richards, A., et al., 2008. Ibid. p. 387 and 56.
- 48.
In addition, the US had granted a substantial amount of “agricultural credits,” and to all accounts could have been said to be “courting” Iraq. Cleveland, W.L., and Bunton, M., 2013. Ibid. p. 448.
- 49.
Yevgeny Primakov, former head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, Foreign Minister and Prime Minister of Russia (1998–99).
- 50.
In Yevgeny Primakov’s memoirs, he recalls Saddam’s belief in his “lucky star”, the USA, and his part in its “foreign policy of containment”. Primakov asserts that even until the end, Hussein believed that there would be some final reprieve, stating that only Iraq, and he, could stand up to Iran. Primakov, Y., 2009. Ibid. p. 315–319.
- 51.
The Gulf Crisis was to be the “crucible of the New World Order”. Wenger, A., and Zimmerman. D., 2003. International Relations : From the Cold War to the Globalized World. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc. p. 237.
- 52.
Not the first time since its independence. The first occasion, it may be noted, took place after the coup d’état in 1958, which brought Abd al-Qasim to power. See Kerr, M.H., 1971. Ibid. p. 20.
- 53.
The amount varies between $13-60-80 billion. In any event the amount was considerable enough to create pressure on Hussein’s regime. See also Cleveland, W.L., and Bunton, M., 2013. Ibid. p. 446; Al-Awadi, H., 2014. op.cit. p. 595; Best, A., et al., Ibid. p. 489.
- 54.
This had been a point of controversy for Saudi Arabia as the primary producer within OPEC, since the production quotas had been instigated in 1986. Interestingly, Iraq had been amongst those who openly abused the system. See Richards, A., et al., 2008. Ibid. p. 56.
- 55.
Hussein’s regime also accused Kuwait of “slant-drilling”, and “stealing” $2.4 billion in oil. Kuwait later admitted abusing the quota system. See Cleveland, W. L., and Bunton, M., 2013. Ibid. p. 446–7. See also Al-Awadi, H., Ibid. p. 595.
- 56.
According to Eric Davis, the manipulation of oil prices through over-production (and against the OPEC quota) was deliberate on the part of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, who were afraid of Iraqi military power and wished to counteract what they assumed would be an amassing of “might” against them. That the over-production of oil was deliberate was a view apparently shared by Saddam Hussein at the time. See Primakov, Y., 2009. Ibid. p. 316; and Davis, E., 2014. op.cit.. p. 521.
- 57.
Estimates of the Iraqi population put the ruling Sunni population at roughly 20% occupying the central region, with Shi’a and Kurdish populations existing predominantly in the Southern regions and the North respectively, making up the remainder. Davis, E., 2014. Ibid. p. 514.
- 58.
As per the majority of the population, the Shi’a community made up the majority of the Iraqi army. Saddam Hussein was particularly sensitive to the possibility of being ousted by a Shi’a uprising. See Best, A., et al., 2008. Ibid. p. 489.
- 59.
Saddam Hussein even went so far as to bargain withdrawal from Kuwait, with Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza and the West Bank. See Cleveland, W.L., and Bunton, M., 2013. Ibid. p. 449.
- 60.
- 61.
According to Yevgeny Primakov’s account of this saga, there was some evidence to support the fact that the UN commission was not “impartial”, and that during Richard Butler’s tenure as head of the commission, the CIA were actively looking for information that could lead to “toppling” the Iraqi leader. In addition, according to Tim Weiner, the UN Commission investigators let in after the Gulf War included amongst its ranks CIA officers. See Wiener, T., 2008. Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. London: Penguin Books. p. 495; and Primakov, Y., 2009. Ibid. p. 318.
- 62.
The only exceptions made were for medicine, food and “other items” deemed “humanitarian” items of assistance, although due to the “dual-use items” list, which included certain chemicals (such as sodium fluoride for example), and “spare parts for power, water and sanitation”, this actually excluded far more with increasingly adverse consequences for the re-building and reconstruction of vital infrastructure. In addition, Iraq was only allowed to sell restricted amounts of oil, its revenue controlled and regulated by a United Nations bank. Whatever was left after paying off its obligations under the cease-fire agreement, was siphoned off by Saddam Hussein’s elite clique. Both his sons became notorious for their ability to circumvent the sanctions, auctioning off oil and pocketing the proceeds. See Cleveland, W. L., and Bunton, M., 2013. Ibid. p. 455–6. See also Davis, E., 2014. Ibid. p. 521, and Richards, A., et al., 2008. Ibid. p. 104.
- 63.
In some texts referred to as the “intifada”. See Davis, E., 2014. Loc.cit.
- 64.
According to some sources, these uprisings had been “courted” by the USA during the war, but immediately “dropped” once the cease-fire was in place, leaving both groups of insurgents to Hussein’s forces. See Wenger, A., and Zimmerman, D., 2003. Ibid. p. 234; and Wiener, T., 2008. op.cit. p. 395.
- 65.
Egypt received debt relief to the value of $20 billion. Sudan however, lost its financial support from the Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development (AAAID), an instrument of the Arab Fund. See Richards, A., et al., 2008. Ibid. pp. 250 and 387.
- 66.
For Yemen, an “agro-poor” country reliant on diaspora remittances for its foreign exchange, the Gulf War had a devastating effect. Through diaspora remittances Jordan had become accustomed to receiving $1.3 billion per year. See Richards, A., et al., 2008. Ibid. p. 68; Brand, L. A., 2014. Ibid. p. 567.
- 67.
Jordan reportedly “lost” the equivalent of $1.3 billion per year due to expelled nationals working in other states. Brand, L. A., 2014. Loc.cit.
- 68.
First time job entrants were left to compete with seasoned and skilled returning workers, which heightened tensions between those extant and those returning. Richards, A., et al., 2008. Ibid. p. 401.
- 69.
Jordan was penalised economically for not joining the coalition against Iraq, resulting in a 17% economic “shrinkage”. Cammett, M., 2014. Ibid. p. 163.
- 70.
- 71.
This was later rectified through the creation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) using Iraqi input, but still, however, using “US technical expertise”. See Davis, E., 2014. Ibid. p. 524.
- 72.
Other estimates put Iraqi refugees at 100,000 per month. See Best, A., et al., 2008. Ibid. p. 529.
- 73.
Unlike the previous influx of immigrants after the Gulf War of 1991, however, these refugees were poor and downtrodden from the years of sanctions. They added significantly to Jordanian social and economic woes, creating housing pressures and price increases. Brand, L.A., 2014. Ibid. p. 567–8.
- 74.
By 2008 it was reported that Iran had over 3000 functional centrifuges in Natanz. See Cleveland, W. L., and Bunton, M., 2013. Ibid. p. 516.
- 75.
Post-2010 parliament elections, Iraqi candidates (“political actors”) went to Iran for guidance from Iranian leaders. They therefore became instrumental in the formation of the new Iraqi government. See Davis, E., 2014. Ibid. p. 534.
- 76.
For example, the price of oil had dropped from $13.5 billion in 1985 to $9.6 billion in 1986 and 1987. Cavatorta, F., 2002. The Failed Liberalisation of Algeria and the International Context: A Legacy of Stable Authoritarianism. The Journal of North African Studies. p. 11.
- 77.
The Islamic Salvation Army or Front (AIS) and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) See Law, R., 2009. Ibid. p. 313; Lee, R., and Ben Shitrit, L., 2014. Religion, Society, and Politics in the Middle East. In Lust, E., (Ed.) 2014. Ibid. p. 242–243.
- 78.
The spread of transnational and intra-regional crime: smuggling, drug trafficking, kidnapping and hostage taking, and infiltration of the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) . See Spencer, C., 2012. Strategic Posture Review: Algeria. World Politics Review [online] worldpoliticsreview.com; and Boukhars, A., 2012. Simmering Discontent in the Western Sahara. The Carnegie Papers. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. [online] www.carnegieEndowment.org/pubs
- 79.
Morocco rejoined the AU in January of 2017. See 2017. Morocco rejoins African Union after more than 30 years. The Guardian [online] January 31.
- 80.
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia al-Hamra and Rio de Oro.
- 81.
Government established in 1976 in Algeria. See Boukhars, A., 2012. op.cit. p. 3.
- 82.
Over the years and in response to the calls for proposed referenda regarding independence, numbers of people from different ethnic Sahrawi groups outside the Western Sahara have been encouraged to take up residence there, and offered state housing, subsidies, tax exemptions, and other kinds of subsidised incentives. The deferential treatment has created resentment and open hostility between those already resident and incoming settlers. See Boukhars, A., 2012. Ibid. pp. 9–10.
- 83.
Friction emerged between ex-Polisario members recently returned to the Western Sahara, Moroccans, Sahrawis from Tindouf (Algeria), and Northern Moroccan Sahrawis present in the Western Sahara. See Boukhars, A., 2012. Ibid. pp. 10–13.
- 84.
Kidnapping, hostage trading, and smuggling fund AQIM. Tawil, C., 2010. The Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb : Expansion in the Sahel and Challenges from Within Jihadist Circles. Washington DC: The Jamestown Foundation.
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Hierro, L. (2020). Resilience Assessment Part One. In: Dividing Africa with Policy. Library of Public Policy and Public Administration, vol 14. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41302-6_7
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