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Introduction

Chapter
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Abstract

The globalization of the semiconductor industry has helped to reduce the overall cost by the worldwide distribution of integrated circuit (IC) design, fabrication, and deployment, it also introduces ever-increasing intellectual property (IP) privacy and integrity infringement. In this chapter, the major IP violations and corresponding promising protection strategies are introduced. The main materials for each chapter are also summarized.

Keywords

IP privacy and integrity violations Hardware Trojan Reverse engineering Fault attack Split manufacturing IC camouflaging Physical unclonable function 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Electrical and Computer EngineeringThe University of Texas at AustinAustinUSA

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