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Modelling the Impact of Threat Intelligence on Advanced Persistent Threat Using Games

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 12065))

Abstract

System administrator time is not dedicated to just cyber security tasks. With a wide variety of activities that need to be undertaken being able to monitor and respond to cyber security incidents is not always possible. Advanced persistent threats to critical systems make this even harder to manage.

The model presented in this paper looks at the Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain as a method of representing advanced persistent threats to a system. The model identifies the impact that using threat intelligence gains over multiple attacks to help better defend a system.

Presented as a game between a persistent attacker and a dedicated defender, findings are established by utilising simulations of repeated attacks. Experimental methods are used to identify the impact that threat intelligence has on the capability for the defender to reduce the likelihood of harm to the system.

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Fielder, A. (2020). Modelling the Impact of Threat Intelligence on Advanced Persistent Threat Using Games. In: Di Pierro, A., Malacaria, P., Nagarajan, R. (eds) From Lambda Calculus to Cybersecurity Through Program Analysis. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12065. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41103-9_8

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